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Case No. 19678 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
T h i s i s an a c t i o n by P l a i n t i f f s , a l l e g i n g b reach of a 
l e a s e a g r e e m e n t and a C o u n t e r c l a i m by Defendan t s a l l e g i n g 
t h a t P l a i n t i f f s 1 c o n d u c t and t h e conduc t of t h e a d j a c e n t 
t e n a n t c o n s t i t u t e d a b r e a c h of t h e l e a s e a g r e e m e n t , and a 
c o n s t r u c t i v e e v i c t i o n of D e f e n d a n t s . 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The m a t t e r was t r i e d t o t h e c o u r t s i t t i n g w i t h o u t a 
j u r y a n d t h e t r i a l c o u r t r e n d e r e d a judgment in b e h a l f of 
P l a i n t i f f s and a g a i n s t Defendan t s fo r t h e e n t i r e amount of 
t h e f u t u r e r e n t a l d u e u n d e r t h e l e a s e agreement and fo r 
d a m a g e s a n d t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i s m i s s e d D e f e n d a n t s 1 
C o u n t e r c l a i m , no cause of a c t i o n . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
A p p e l l a n t s e e k s t o have t h e judgment of t h e t r i a l c o u r t 
r e v e r s e d , and a d e t e r m i n a t i o n made t h a t D e f e n d a n t s a r e 
e n t i t l e d t o d a m a g e s on t h e i r c o u n t e r c l a i m ; o r , i n t h e 
a l t e r n a t i v e , a new t r i a l w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t r e g a r d i n g t h e a p p l i c a b l e law; a n d / o r , a r e m i t t i t u r or 
a r e d u c t i o n in t h e award t o t h e P l a i n t i f f s , 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1 . On o r a b o u t t h e 1 5 t h day of Sep tember , 1980, The 
P l a i n t i f f s , owners and o c c u p a n t s of t h e basement and second 
f l o o r (R. 430) of a b u i l d i n g l o c a t e d a t 2710 E a s t 3300 South 
i n S a l t L a k e C i t y , U t a h e n t e r e d i n t o a w r i t t e n l e a s e 
a g r e e m e n t w i t h D e f e n d a n t s fo r 60% of t h e main f l o o r fo r a 
p e r i o d of 5 y e a r s , (R. 403) The r e n t was t o be p a i d in t h e 
- 2 -
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sum of $ 1 , 1 0 0 on t h e f i r s t day of each and every month. 
(Exhibi t 1-P). 
2 . When t h e D e f e n d a n t s s i g n e d t h e w r i t t e n l e a s e 
a g r e e m e n t ( E x h i b i t 1-P), the e n t i r e main f loor was vacant . 
(R. 403, 512.) 
3 . On October 3 , 1980, two weeks l a t e r , the P l a i n t i f f s 
e n t e r e d i n t o a w r i t t e n l e a s e a g r e e m e n t w i t h Greco and 
A s s o c i a t e s , h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o as I n t e r m o u n t a i n 
M a r k e t i n g , t o l ea se the space adjacent (R. 448, 516) to the 
D e f e n d a n t s 1 s p a c e w i t h o c c u p a n c y to commence on tne same 
date as t h a t of Defendants. (Exhibi t 29-P, R. 432.) 
4 . The D e f e n d a n t s 1 p r e m i s e s were s i t u a t e d in the 
l e a s e h o l d p r o p e r t y in such a manner as to r equ i r e them to 
u s e a common e n t r y w a y and h a l l w a y w i t h I n t e r m o u n t a i n 
M a r k e t i n g . ( E x h i b i t 42-d) In a d d i t i o n , the employees and 
c l i e n t s of Defendants would have to pass by the en t rance to 
I n t e r m o u n t a i n M a r k e t i n g t o g e t t o t h e e n t r a n c e t o 
Defendants1 leased premises . (R. 601, 606) 
5 . The a d j a c e n t t e n a n t s , I n t e r m o u n t a i n Market ing 
b r o u g h t l a r g e g r o u p s of s a l e s t r a i n e e s i n t o t h e i r premises 
- 3 -
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t o i n s t r u c t and m o t i v a t e them to go out and s e l l var ious 
household wares on a door to door b a s i s . (R. 600) 
6. In t h e p r o c e s s of i n t e r v i e w i n g , t r a i n i n g and 
m o t i v a t i n g the var ious s a l e s p e r s o n s , Intermountain Marketing 
engaged in p r a c t i c e s which included the fo l lowing: 
a . T h e s e r v i n g a n d c o n s u m p t i o n of 
r e f r e s h m e n t s in the h a l l s during break t imes . (R. 
543, 590-591, 606, 625-626, 672) 
b . S e t t i n g up r e g i s t r a t i o n t a b l e s in the 
hal lway. (R. 522-523, 589-590, 606, 672) 
c . P e r m i t t i n g t h e t r a i n e e s t o e n g a g e in 
p r a c t i c e s e s s i o n s w i t h one another in the h a l l s 
during break t imes . (R. 544, 626, 716) 
d . P e r m i t t i n g l a rge numbers of t r a i n e e s and 
s a l e s p e r s o n s to overload the bathrooms, smoke, put 
l i p s t i c k on the wall (R. 675) , f i l l the s inks with 
p a p e r t o w e l s , ex t ingu i sh c i g a r e t t e s on the f loo r s 
and i n t h e t o i l e t s , and consume a l l the paper 
s e r v i c e m a k i n g them u n s u i t a b l e on f r e q u e n t 
o c c a s i o n s f o r t h e Defendants or t h e i r c l i e n t s t o 
- 4 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
u s e . (R. 4 4 1 , 4 4 5 - 4 4 6 , 5 4 4 - 5 4 6 , 548 -549 , 607, 
643-644 , 6 7 2 - 6 7 3 , 675-676 , 712 , 723-724) 
e . Permit t ing boxes of merchandise to remain 
i n t h e h a l l s t o be s o l d o r d e l i v e r e d to 
s a l e s p e r s o n s a n d / o r cus tomers of Intermountain 
M a r k e t i n g . (R. 462, 522-523, 592-593, 728, ["The 
hallways . . . looked l ike a warehouse."] R. 518) 
f. During the s a l e s and t ra in ing sessions, 
l a r g e numbers of people would be arr iving at the 
I n t e r m o u n t a i n Marke t ing off ices . (R. 603, 716) 
As employees or c l i e n t s of Defendants would 
a t t e m p t to make t h e i r way through the hal l they 
would on o c c a s i o n be stopped and/or directed by 
I n t e r m o u n t a i n Marketing people into the sales and 
t r a i n i n g s e s s i o n s . (R. 447, 521-522 , 543 , 
586-590) 
g. During t h e s a l e s and t ra in ing sessions, 
t he i n s t r u c t o r s of Intermountain Marketing would 
cause the t r a i n e e s and salespersons to engage in 
a c t i v i t i e s w h i c h w e r e e x t r e m e l y no i sy and 
- 5 -
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d i s t u r b e d t h e D e f e n d a n t s . Those p r a c t i c e s 
inc luded: 
(1) Count down d r i l l s in which the 
p a r t i c i p a n t s would count-down backwards, 
s h o u t i n g o u t l o u d , in un ison from the 
number t e n t o t h e number one, followed 
by t h e shout "I f ee l g r e a t , " followed by 
l o u d c l a p p i n g , c h e e r i n g , and t h e 
s t a m p i n g of f e e t . (R. 439-440, 447-448, 
4 5 0 , 5 2 5 , 5 3 4 , 5 4 2 , 6 0 4 - 6 0 5 , 6 2 0 , 
6 2 4 - 6 2 5 , 6 3 2 , 6 7 0 , 7 1 2 , 7 1 5 - 7 1 6 , 7 2 1 , 
723, 727) 
(2) The t r a i n e e s and sa l e spe r sons 
w o u l d e n g a g e i n l o u d l a u g h t e r and 
c l a p p i n g on a pe r iod i c b a s i s . (R. 465, 
5 2 5 - 5 2 7 , 609, 623, 624) On occasion the 
i n s t r u c t o r would throw a p ie in the face 
on someone p r e s e n t to get the t r a i n e e s 
to scream with l a u g h t e r . (R. 524-525} 
(3) P l a y i n g l o u d s t e r e o m u s i c , 
( r o c k , new wave , e t c . ) e v e r y day t o 
- 6 -
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e s t a b l i s h an a t m o s p h e r e a s t h e young 
t r a i n e e s would come t o t h e i r o f f i c e . 
(R. 528, 615-616, 624, 669-670) 
7 . The w a l l s which separa ted the P l a i n t i f f s from the 
D e f e n d a n t s were s e m i - p o r t a b l e wal ls c a l l e d " U l t r a - w a l l s " , 
i n s t a l l e d over the c a r p e t . (R. 449) 
8 . The wal ls lacked s u f f i c i e n t i n s u l a t i o n , to i n s u l a t e 
P l a i n t i f f s 1 p r e m i s e s from t h e n o i s e e m a n a t i n g from the 
Defendants1 p remises . (R. 511, 642-643). 
9 . The c e i l i n g s were suspended c e i l i n g s which were not 
i n s u l a t e d between o f f i c e s . (R. 526) 
1 0 . When the noise and d i s tu rbances would emanate from 
I n t e r m o u n t a i n M a r k e t i n g ' s p r e m i s e s , the Defendants would 
have t o t e r m i n a t e t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s u n t i l the d i s tu rbance 
would cease . That would r equ i r e the Defendants t o : 
a . E i t h e r s t o p or d e l a y t h e i r t e l e p h o n e 
c o n v e r s a t i o n s . (R. 526, 727-728) 
b . E i t h e r s t o p o r d e l a y t h e i r s a l e s 
p r e s e n t a t i o n s to t h e i r c l i e n t s . (R. 526-527, 728) 
- 7 -
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1 1 . The d i s t u r b a n c e s c o n t i n u e d or i n c r e a s e d so 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y jus t prior to the time that Defendants vacated 
the premises tha t the following occurred: 
a. The Defendants1 secre ta r ies and personnel 
were becoming u p s e t by the frequent outburs ts . 
(R. 671) 
b . Because of the problems and dis turbances, 
t h e Defendants could no l onge r s a f e l y use the 
o f f i c e s to d e a l wi th prospect ive c l i en t s and to 
make s a l e s p r e s e n t a t i o n s . Ninety percent of the 
b u s i n e s s Defendants conducted at the i r offices was 
i n t e r v i e w s wi th c l i e n t s . (R. 513) The most 
i m p o r t a n t f u n c t i o n of the office was sa l e s . (R. 
649) 
The Defendants' salespersons stopped bringing 
t h e i r c l i e n t s and p r o s p e c t i v e c l i en t s into the 
o f f i c e for fear of loss of sales which would occur 
as a r e s u l t of the problems in the h a l l s , and the 
n o i s e and o u t b u r s t s . The salespersons began to 
conduc t a l l t h e i r business outside of the office 
- 8 -
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t o a v o i d t h e e m b a r a s s m e n t and p o t e n t i a l l o s s of 
s a l e s . (R. 659-660, 664-665, 712-713, 718) 
c . C l i e n t s of t h e D e f e n d a n t s who came to 
D e f e n d a n t s ' o f f i ce would respond with shock a t the 
o u t b u r s t s of n o i s e and c h e e r i n g and i t was 
n e c e s s a r y f o r Defendants to make exp lana t ions to 
p a c i f y t h e c l i e n t s and p rospec t ive c l i e n t s . (R. 
527, 532, 579, 671-672, 716, 728) 
1 2 . T h e I n t e r m o u n t a i n M a r k e t i n g , t r a i n e e s and 
s a l e s p e r s o n s who would a t t end the meetings which were held 
t h r e e d a y s a week every week (R. 602-603) would completely 
f i l l t h e e n t i r e p a r k i n g l o t , overflow to the s t r e e t , f i l l 
a l l t h e a v a i l a b l e nearby s t r e e t parking and would overflow 
i n t o t h e c h u r c h p a r k i n g l o t down t h e s t r e e t . (R. 446, 
520-521, 641, 679, 766-767) 
1 3 . At l e a s t t h r e e d a y s a week , during most of the 
d a y , t h e r e were no parking spaces a v a i l a b l e in the parking 
l o t or n e a r b y where e i t h e r t h e employees of Defendant or 
t h e i r c l i e n t s could park . (R. 520-521, 608, 669, 674, 724, 
729) This f a c t u a l r e c i t a t i o n was supported by the test imony 
of H e c t o r Diaz R. 5 2 0 - 5 2 1 , A l i c e Thompson R. 669, 674, 
- 9 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
V e r l i n Nelsen R. 674, Blaine Stonebraker 729, and John Greco 
of I n t e r m o u n t a i n Marke t ing R. 608. The t e s t i m o n y was 
s u b s t a n t i a l and d e t a i l e d the e f for t s made on occasion to 
a t t e m p t t o d i r e c t p a r k i n g to l o c a t i o n s o t h e r than the 
parking l o t . 
P l a i n t i f f s did not introduce any testimony which would 
r e b u t t h e d e t a i l e d t e s t i m o n y p r e s e n t e d by Defendan ts 
r e g a r d i n g the p a r k i n g excep t to have the P la in t i f f Ethna 
Reid t e s t i f y and make the f o l l o w i n g statement which was 
essen t i a l ly repeated by her once or twice: 
"Parking had never been a problem and they claimed 
i t had. 
I was in the office on a considerable number 
of days and I never found i t impossible to ever 
park a t any t ime as long as I went to the back 
p a r k i n g l o t and t h a t t h o s e parking spaces were 
vacan t if peop le wanted to use them . . . " (R. 
781) 
14. On numerous o c c a s i o n s , ice and snow covered the 
p a r k i n g lot and entryway to the building making i t hazardous 
for the Defendants and the i r c l i e n t s . (R. 712, 724) 
1 5 . The Defendants made numerous c o m p l a i n t s to 
P l a i n t i f f s about t h e conduct of Intermountain Marketing. 
( E x h i b i t s 18 -d , 19 -d , 20-d , 23-d , 24-d , and 25 -d , R. 
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4 4 1 - 4 5 3 , 4 5 8 - 4 5 9 , 530-533) During the summer of 1981, the 
P l a i n t i f f s had m e e t i n g s w i t h t h e D e f e n d a n t s and w i t h 
I n t e r m o u n t a i n Marke t ing and P l a i n t i f f s asked Intermountain 
M a r k e t i n g t o cease t h e i r d i s t u r b i n g conduct. (R. 465, 536, 
7 6 3 , 771) P l a i n t i f f s had t h e i r a t t o r n e y wr i t e a l e t t e r to 
I n t e r m o u n t a i n M a r k e t i n g demanding t h e i r c e s s a t i o n of such 
conduct . (R. 466-468, 774, 778, Exh ib i t s 21-d, 22-P) 
1 6 . For a p e r i o d of t i m e f o l l o w i n g t h e m e e t i n g s 
b e t w e e n P l a i n t i f f s , Defendants and Intermountain Marketing, 
and w r i t t e n demands , some of the problems were a l l e v i a t e d . 
(R. 536-537, 673, 764, 771, 773-774, 778) 
1 7 . A l t h o u g h the noise had abated somewhat during the 
summer and F a l l of 1981, (R. 536, 765) in January of 1982, 
and t h e r e a f t e r , I n t e r m o u n t a i n M a r k e t i n g re turned to i t s 
e a r l i e r s c h e d u l e of n o i s e and c o u n t - d o w n d r i l l s . (R. 
4 6 8 - 4 6 9 , 5 3 6 , 607-608, 627-628, 673-674, 716-717, 768, 771, 
Exhibi t 23-d) 
1 8 . D e f e n d a n t s c o m p l a i n e d about the d i s tu rbances to 
P l a i n t i f f s on s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s and w r o t e l e t t e r s t o 
P l a i n t i f f s . ( E x h i b i t s 1 8 - d , 1 9 - d , 20-d, 23-d, 24-d, and 
25-d, R. 441-453, 458-459, 530-533) 
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19. In response to the Complaints by Defendants, from 
and a f t e r December 15 , 1981 , the the P la in t i f f s took no 
act ion. (R. 471-477, 487, 776, 779-780, 784) 
20. P l a i n t i f f s were s e p a r a t e d from t h e no i se and 
con fus ion c r e a t e d by In te rmoun ta in Marketing by Concrete 
F l o o r s which permitted l i t t l e or no noise to be transmitted 
to P l a i n t i f f s 1 premises. (R. 450, 512, 708.) 
2 1 . In a d d i t i o n , a f t e r In termounta in Marketing had 
moved i n t o the premises, the P l a in t i f f s isolated the second 
f l o o r and the basement from the main f l o o r t e n a n t s by 
c o n s t r u c t i n g a sound barr ier and glass wall at the entry way 
to t h e b u i l d i n g so that the occupants of the main floor and 
t h e i r c l i e n t s , entered by a door and hal l separate from that 
of the P l a i n t i f f s . (R. 698-699) 
22. During t h e l a s t s e v e r a l months of 1981, and the 
f i r s t two months of 1982, the conduct of Intermountain 
Marke t ing was d i s t u rb ing Defendants1 business to the point 
t h a t t h e manager of t h e local office and personnel at the 
n a t i o n a l office became concerned about the potent ia l loss of 
b u s i n e s s which would occur if the Defendants continued to 
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o c c u p y t h e premises under the cond i t ions which e x i s t e d . (R. 
691-693, 658-660) 
2 3 . The D e f e n d a n t s s e n t P l a i n t i f f s a l e t t e r dated 
December 1 2 , 1981, demanding t h a t P l a i n t i f f s take ac t ion to 
a l l e v i a t e t h e p r o b l e m s . P l a i n t i f f s t o o k no a c t i o n , in 
r e s p o n s e t h e r e t o . (R. 7 0 2 - 7 0 4 , 706-707) The Defendants 
t h e r e a f t e r n o t i f i e d P l a i n t i f f s t h a t they considered the 
l e a s e a g r e e m e n t to be breached by P l a i n t i f f s and Defendants 
v a c a t e d t h e p r e m i s e s on or a b o u t F e b r u a r y 1 2 , 1 9 8 2 . 
(Exhibi t 2-P and R. 542) 
D u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d of t i m e , t h e P l a i n t i f f s took the 
p o s i t i o n t h a t no p r o b l e m e x i s t e d . (See Exhib i t s 26-P and 
33-P). The Plaintiff Ethna Reid testified as follows: 
" . . . [ T j h e r e was no problem. . . t h e r e j u s t had 
n o t been a p r o b l e m . In t e rmoun ta in Marketing, I 
d i d n o t f e e l , was making a noise or a confusion. 
I d i d n o t t h i n k t h a t they had c rea ted any problem 
f o r Mutua l of Omaha, not as se r ious a problem as 
Mr. Morten was t r y i n g to make o u t . " (R. 784) 
C o n c e r n i n g t h e p r o b l e m s o t h e r t h a n p a r k i n g , t h e 
f o r e g o i n g u n s u b s t a n t i a t e d o p i n i o n of the P l a i n t i f f Ethna 
R e i d , was t h e o n l y t e s t i m o n y o f f e r e d t o r e b u t t h e 
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o v e r w h e l m i n g t e s t i m o n y and e v i d e n c e o f f e r e d by t h e 
Defendants . 
2 4 . W i t h i n a few d a y s a f t e r Defendants vacated the 
p r e m i s e s , P l a i n t i f f s e n t e r e d i n t o a l ease agreement with 
I n t e r m o u n t a i n M a r k e t i n g ( E x h i b i t 31 -P ) t o l e a s e a 
s u b s t a n t i a l p o r t i o n of the premises p rev ious ly occupied by 
D e f e n d a n t s , w i t h o c c u p a n c y t o commence on Apr i l 1, 1982. 
(R. 612-614, 699-701) 
2 5 . W i t h i n a few weeks a f t e r Defendants vacated the 
p r e m i s e s , P l a i n t i f f s e n t e r e d i n t o an a d d i t i o n a l l ea se 
a g r e e m e n t t o l e a s e v i r t u a l l y the e n t i r e main f loor of the 
p r e m i s e s t o I n t e r m o u n t a i n M a r k e t i n g ( E x h i b i t 30-P, R. 
612-614, 699-701) 
2 6 . S h o r t l y a f t e r Defendants vacated the p remises , the 
P l a i n t i f f s r e m o d e l l e d t h e p r e m i s e s f o r o c c u p a n c y by 
I n t e r m o u n t a i n M a r k e t i n g , and Intermountain Marketing took 
p o s s e s s i o n of the newly remodeled po r t ion of the premises on 
or about Ju ly 1, 1982. (Exhibi t 30-P) 
2 7 . P l a i n t i f f s f i l e d t h i s ac t ion aga ins t Defendants on 
A p r i l 1 2 , 1 9 8 2 , D e f e n d a n t s Counterclaimed and a t r i a l was 
he ld . 
- 1 4 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 8 . A f t e r D e f e n d a n t s h a d v a c a t e d a n d had moved t o 
t h e i r new l o c a t i o n t h e y n o t e d a s u b s t a n t i a l i n c r e a s e i n 
t h e i r b u s i n e s s , w h i c h t h e y i n p a r t a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e a g e n t s ' 
a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d a n d u t i l i z a t i o n of t h e new o f f i c e s . (R. 
6 6 0 - 6 6 1 , 666 ) 
T h e P l a i n t i f f s o f f e r e d r^£ e v i d e n c e t o r e b u t a n y of 
t h e f o r e g o i n g s t a t e m e n t s of f a c t s e x c e p t a s i n d i c a t e d . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE SPECIFIC 
F I N D I N G S ON ALL MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT 
AND SUCH FAILURE ALONE CONSTITUTES 
REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
A . T H E T R I A L COURT F A I L E D TO MAKE 
S P E C I F I C F I N D I N G S ON THE PERTINENT 
ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT. 
R u l e 52 o f t h e U t a h R u l e s of C i v i l P r o c e d u r e r e q u i r e s 
t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o m a k e s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and 
c o n c l u s i o n s of l a w . The r u l e p r o v i d e s a s f o l l o w s : 
" I n a l l a c t i o n s t r i e d upon t h e f a c t s w i t h o u t 
a j u r y o r w i t h an a d v i s o r y j u r y , t h e c o u r t s h a l l 
f i n d t h e f a c t s s p e c i a l l y and s t a t e s e p a r a t e l y i t s 
c o n c l u s i o n s of l aw t h e r e o n . . . " 
T h e r u l e h a s b e e n u p h e l d by t h e U t a h Supreme C o u r t i n 
s e v e r a l c a s e s w h i c h h a v e h e l d t h a t f a i l u r e t o make f i n d i n g s 
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on a l l m a t e r i a l i s sues cons t i tu tes reversible e r ror , (See 
Romrel l v . Zions F i r s t N a t i o n a l Bank N.A., 611 P. 2d 392 
(Utah 1980 ) ; Boyer Co. v . L i g n e l l , 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 
1 9 7 7 ) ; Gaddis I n v e s t m e n t Co, v . Morrison/ 3 Utah 2d 43, 
278 P.2d 284 (1954,).) 
A review of the s o - c a l l e d Findings of Fact (R. 353) 
d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t they a r e not f i n d i n g s but instead are 
c o n c l u s i o n s . A p p e l l a n t s r e s p e c t f u l l y c a l l the cou r t ' s 
a t t e n t i o n to t h e f o l l o w i n g p a r a g r a p h s which Appellants 
submit are not findings but instead are conclusions: 
P a r a g r a p h s 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 , 1 3 , 17, 23, and 28. (R. 
353-358) 
A review of the f a c t u a l r ec i t a t ion contained in th i s 
b r i e f d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t s u b s t a n t i a l factual issues were 
p r e s e n t e d to the t r i a l court , but the t r i a l court fa i led to 
make s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g s on any of t h e f a c t u a l i s s u e s 
presented. 
Defendan t s respectful ly submit tha t the fa i lure of the 
t r i a l c o u r t to make f i n d i n g s on those issues cons t i tu tes 
revers ible e r ror . 
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B . HAD THE TRIAL COURT MADE SPECIFIC 
FINDINGS ON THE PERTINENT FACTUAL ISSUES 
BEFORE THE COURT, THOSE FINDINGS WOULD 
HAVE SUPPORTED DEFENDANTS' CLAIMS AND 
WOULD HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT PLAINTIFFS 
WERE NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER ON THEIR 
COMPLAINT, 
A r e v i e w of t h e f a c t u a l r e c i t a t i o n i n t h i s b r i e f 
d e m o n s t r a t e s s u b s t a n t i a l , u n c o n t r a v e r t e d e v i d e n c e and 
t e s t i m o n y was p r e s e n t e d t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t by D e f e n d a n t s . 
I n r e g a r d t o s e v e r a l i s s u e s , t h e t r i a l c o u r t he ld t h a t 
f u r t h e r t e s t i m o n y w o u l d be c u m u l a t i v e a n d would no t be 
p e r m i t t e d . 
S i n c e no t e s t i m o n y or e v i d e n c e was i n t r o d u c e d t o r e b u t 
t h e s u b s t a n t i a l t e s t i m o n y i n t r o d u c e d by Defendan t s t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t was o b l i g e d t o make f i n d i n g s c o n s i s t e n t wi th t h a t 
t e s t i m o n y and e v i d e n c e . 
Not o n l y d i d t h e t r i a l c o u r t f a i l t o make s p e c i f i c 
f i n d i n g s c o n s i s t e n t w i th t h e f a c t s s e t f o r t h in t h e f a c t u a l 
r e c i t a t i o n of t h i s b r i e f , bu t a l s o i t mere ly s t a t e d t h a t t h e 
c l a i m s of Defendan t s "were w i t h o u t m e r i t . " (R. 280) 
A l t h o u g h t h e t r i a l was commenced on J u l y 1 8 , 1984, t h e 
t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t i s s u e i t s Memorandum D e c i s i o n u n t i l 
September 29 , 1983 . 
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The D e f e n d a n t s r e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t h a t t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s f a i l u r e t o make f i n d i n g s on a l l t h e r e l e v e n t and 
p e r t i n e n t i s s u e s a n d t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s f a i l u r e t o make 
f i n d i n g s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e u n c o n t r a v e r t e d t e s t i m o n y and 
e v i d e n c e c o n s t i t u t e d r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . 
C. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED FURTHER 
ERROR BY ENTERING CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS. 
The f o l l o w i n g U t a h c a s e s have h e l d t h a t f i n d i n g s a r e 
n e c e s s a r y t o s u p p o r t c o n c l u s i o n s of law. B.T. Morgan, 
I n c . v . F i r s t S e c u r i t y C o r p o r a t i o n , 82 Utah 316, 24 P .2d 
38 4 ( 1 9 3 3 ) ; a n d P a r r o t t B r o s . Co. v . Ogden C i t y , 50 Utah 
512 , 167 P . 807 ( 1 9 1 7 ) . 
T h e r e a r e n o f i n d i n g s t o s u p p o r t t h e f o l l o w i n g 
c o n c l u s i o n s of law: 
P a r a g r a p h s 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6, 7 , 8 and 9 and t h e r e f o r e 
p a r a g r a p h 10 as w e l l . (R. 359-361) 
A b s e n t f i n d i n g s t o s u p p o r t t h e c o n c l u s i o n s , t h e 
c o n c l u s i o n s of l a w m u s t f a i l and l i k e w i s e t h e judgment 
r e n d e r e d in r e l i a n c e t h e r e o n . 
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POINT NO. I I 
P L A I N T I F F S ' CONDUCT AND ITS FAILURE TO 
TAKE ADEQUATE MEASURES TO ALLEVIATE THE 
C O N D I T I O N S CAUSED BY INTERMOU NTAIN 
MARKETING CONSTITUTED A CONSTRUCTIVE 
E V I C T I O N OF DEFENDANTS FROM THE 
PREMISES. 
A. THE LAW OF CONSTRUCTIVE EVICTION. 
The d o c t r i n e of C o n s t r u c t i v e E v i c t i o n has long been 
r e c o g n i z e d by t h e Utah Supreme C o u r t . I n B a r k e r v . U t a h 
O i l R e f i n i n g C o . , 1 1 1 U t a h 308 , 178 P .2d 386 , 388 ( 1 9 4 7 ) , 
t h e U t a h S u p r e m e C o u r t s e t f o r t h t h e Utah law r e g a r d i n g 
c o n s t r u c t i v e e v i c t i o n and quo ted B l a c k ' s Law D i c t i o n a r y as 
f o l l o w s : 
" " A c t u a l e v i c t i o n i s an a c t u a l e x p u l s i o n 
of t h e t e n a n t ou t of a l l or some p a r t of t h e 
d e m i s e d p r e m i s e s ; a p h y s i c a l o u s t e r o r 
d i s p o s s e s s i o n from t h e ve ry t h i n g g r a n t e d or 
some s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t t h e r e o f . * * * 
" C o n s t r u c t i v e e v i c t i o n . * '* * W i t h 
r e f e r e n c e t o t h e r e l a t i o n of l a n d l o r d and 
t e n a n t , t h e r e i s a ' c o n s t r u c t i v e e v i c t i o n 1 
when t h e f o r m e r , w i t h o u t i n t e n t t o o u s t t h e 
l a t t e r , d o e s some a c t w h i c h d e p r i v e s t h e 
t e n a n t of t h e b e n e f i c i a l e n j o y m e n t of t h e 
d e m i s e d p r e m i s e s o r m a t e r i a l l y i m p a i r s such 
en joyment . * * *" 
I n B a r k e r t h e l a n d l o r d c o n v e r t e d a g a r a g e on t h e 
l e a s e d p r e m i s e s t o a d a n c e h a l l w i t h o u t p e r m i s s i o n of t h e 
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t e n a n t . The Court held that such conversion could cons t i tu te 
constructive evic t ion . 
In T h i r t e e n t h & Washington STS. Corp. v. Nelsen, 123 
U t a h 70, 254 P.2d 847 (1953) / the Utah Supreme Court 
r e c o g n i z e d t h e r i g h t of a t e n a n t to claim a constructive 
e v i c t i o n where t h e t e n a n t ' s enjoyment of the premises was 
subs tan t ia l ly dis turbed. In th i s case, the tenants claimed 
a cons t ruc t ive evict ion occurred because the landlord leased 
p o r t i o n s of t he b u i l d i n g for use as a shoe shine stand, 
b e a u t y p a r l o r and barber shop and allowed other conditions 
to ex i s t . The Utah Supreme Court s ta ted: 
"Concerning the g e n e r a l law regarding what 
i n t e r f e r e n c e w i l l c o n s t i t u t e a c o n s t r u c t i v e 
evic t ion , American Jurisprudence has th i s to say: 
"* * * any d i s t u r b a n c e of t he 
t e n a n t ' s possession by the landlord, or 
someone a c t i n g under h i s a u t h o r i t y , 
which r e n d e r s the p r emise s u n f i t for 
occupancy for t he pu rposes for which 
they were demised * * * amounts to a 
c o n s t r u c t i v e e v i c t i o n , p rov ided the 
t e n a n t abandons t he premises within a 
reasonable t ime." 
but properly adds th i s qua l i f i ca t ion : 
"* * * To cons t i tu te a constructive 
e v i c t i o n , the inteference * * * with the 
t e n a n t ' s e n j o y m e n t of t he demised 
p remises must be of a substant ia l nature 
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and so i n j u r i o u s as to deprive him of 
t h e b e n e f i c i a l enjoyment of a part or 
the whole of the demised premises." 
. . . The f a i l u r e to do some a c t or to 
a d e q u a t e l y perform i t , may render a building just 
as u n t e n a n t a b l e as affirmative interference. The 
t e x t in American Jurisprudence further reads: "an 
e v i c t i o n may be based on the landlord ' s omission 
t o a c t where i t i s h i s duty to ac t . " [Emphasis 
added]. 
Where t he l a n d l o r d a u t h o r i z e s conduct by 
a n o t h e r i t i s impu tab l e to him and he must bear 
t he r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for i t . P l a i n t i f f f s agents 
could wel l f o r e s e e t h a t t he s h o e s h i n e s t a n d , 
b a r b e r shop and beauty parlor i n s t a l l a t i ons would 
b r i n g a b o u t t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t w e r e 
e n c o u n t e r e d . The p la in t i f f is answerable for the 
n a t u r a l and probable consequences of the placement 
and o p e r a t i o n of these businesses, as well as for 
t h e d i r e c t c o n s e q u e n c e s of i t s own a c t s or 
fa i lu res to ac t . 
The c o u r t went on to review the circumstances of the 
c a s e , pa r t i cu la r ly the fact that any one given problem might 
n o t h a v e c o n s t i t u t e d a c o n s t r u c t i v e e v i c t i o n , but a 
compos i te of d i f f e r e n t e l emen t s may together comprise a 
constructive evic t ion. The court s ta ted: 
"The law i s a dignified profession involving 
t h e s e l l i n g of o n e ' s s e r v i c e s . P r o f e s s i o n a l 
s t a n d a r d s p r e v e n t a lawyer from advert is ing his 
t a l e n t s , and as a consequence he is dependent upon 
o t h e r means of a t t r ac t ing and holding a c l i e n t e l e . 
In c o n n e c t i o n with the promise of a " f i r s t c lass" 
b u i l d i n g , d e f e n d a n t s had a r ight to expect that 
t h e e n t r a n c e , corridors and offices would present 
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a b u s i n e s s l i k e and a t t r a c t i v e appearance consonant 
w i t h t h e d i g n i t y and r e s p e c t a b i l i t y of t h e i r 
p r o f e s s i o n and t h a t t h e bu i ld ing s e rv i ce s would 
a l s o c o m p o r t t h e r e w i t h . However, even Mr. Kipp, 
p l a i n t i f f f s b u i l d i n g m a n a g e r , a d m i t t e d t h a t 
c e r t a i n of t h e c o n d i t i o n s f e l l be low such 
s tandard , ( Id , a t 851-852.) 
U t a h d o e s n o t s t a n d a l o n e in i t s v iew r e g a r d i n g 
c o n s t r u c t i v e e v i c t i o n , . I n the landmark case of Hannan v. 
H a r p e r 189 Wis . 5 8 8 , 208 N.W. 255, 45 A.L.R. 1119 (1926), 
t h e C o u r t h e l d t h a t the l ea s ing of an upper apartment of a 
t w o - f a m i l y f l a t f o r t h e u s e of a c o l l e g e f r a t e r n i t y 
c o n s t i t u t e d a b r e a c h of the covenant of qu i e t enjoyment in 
t h e l e a s e of a l ower f l a t f o r r e s i d e n t i a l purposes . In 
r e n d e r i n g i t s d e c i s i o n t h e Cour t reviewed numerous o ther 
decisions and stated: 
""An a c t u a l expuls ion from leased premises i s 
n o t n e c e s s a r y to c o n s t i t u t e an e v i c t i o n . Any ac t 
on t h e p a r t of t h e l a n d l o r d which so i n t e r f e r e s 
w i t h t h e t e n a n t f s possess ion of the premises as to 
u n f i t them f o r t h e p u r p o s e f o r which they were 
l e a s e d , and r e n d e r them u n i n h a b i t a b l e for such 
p u r p o s e s , and compel t h e abandonmen t the reof , 
c o n s t i t u t e s an e v i c t i o n . . . . Such an e v i c t i o n 
f u r n i s h e s ground for an ac t ion for such damages as 
a r e t h e n a t u r a l and p r o x i m a t e c o n s e q u e n c e s 
the reo f . " " (208 N.W. a t 258.) 
The annotations following the case in A.L.R. 
d e m o n s t r a t e o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s which a l so follow the same 
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r u l e concerning the landlord ' s respons ib i l i ty in leasing the 
a d j a c e n t premises and in the conduct of other tenants in the 
demised premises. 
S e v e r a l other ju r i sd ic t ions have ruled that loud noises 
c a u s e d by a d j a c e n t t e n a n t s c o n s t i t u t e grounds for 
constructive evic t ion . 
In M i l l b r i d q e Apar tments v. Linden, 151 N.J. Super. 
168 , 376 A. 2d 611 (1977), the court properly held that the 
Res te p r i n c i p l e r e l a t i n g to constructive eviction could be 
a p p l i e d to a s i t u a t i o n s i m i l a r to that before us. There 
d e f e n d a n t s - t e n a n t s frequently complained to the i r landlord 
t h a t t h e i r n e i g h b o r s were e x t r e m e l y l o u d . When the 
l a n d l o r d ' s effor ts to correct the problem were unsuccessful, 
t he tenants began withholding the i r ren t . In the landlord 's 
ensu ing a c t i o n for possession based on nonpayment of rent , 
t he tenants contended that the landlord ' s fa i lu re to correct 
t h e p r o b l e m c o n s t i t u t e d a b reach of t he covenant of 
h a b i t a b i l i t y . 
J u d g e Weinberg s t a t e d t h a t " r e p e a t e d loud n o i s e 
s u f f e r e d by a r e s i d e n t i a l t e n a n t , which could have been 
cured by a landlord, can be a defense to a dispossess action 
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under the rubric of the warranty of h a b i t a b i l i t y . " 151 N.J. 
Super, at 170-171, 376 A.2d 612. He said: 
R e s i d e n t i a l t e n a n t s expec t to l ive within 
r e a s o n a b l e boundar ies of quie t . Continual noise 
of a loud nature infringes upon those expectations 
and makes one's premises "substant ia l ly unsuitable 
for t h e purpose for which they are leased," i . e . , 
o r d i n a r y r e s i d e n t i a l l i v i n g . Accordingly, t h i s 
c o u r t h o l d s t h a t n o i s e may c o n s t i t u t e a 
c o n s t r u c t i v e e v i c t i o n and l e g a l l y j u s t i f y a 
t enan t ' s vacating. . . . (Id. at 613.) 
In G o t t d i e n e r v.- M a i l h o t , 179 N.J. Super. 286, 431 
A.2d 851 (19 81), the Superior Court of New Jersey held that 
t he f a i l u r e of a landlord to prevent adjacent tenants from 
making e x c e s s i v e amounts of noise const i tu ted constructive 
evic t ion . The Superior Court said: 
"The p r imary q u e s t i o n on t h i s appea l i s 
whether defendants , former tenants in p l a i n t i f f s 1 
a p a r t m e n t complex, may invoke the remedy of 
c o n s t r u c t i v e e v i c t i o n by r ea son of p l a i n t i f f s 1 
c la imed f a i l u r e to t a k e s u f f i c i e n t measures to 
p r o t e c t d e f e n d a n t s from e x c e s s i v e l y noisy and 
unruly neighboring t enan t s . " (Id. at 852.) 
The S u p e r i o r Court reviewed the Complaints of the tenant 
which consisted of the following: 
"On s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s in December 1978 and 
J anua ry 1979 defendants complained of " intolerable 
n o i s e " coming from the downstairs apartment, such 
as slamming doors, yel l ing and screaming chi ldren, 
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and excessive volume from the television and radio 
after 10 p.m." (Id^ at 853.) 
The landlord attempted to alleviate the friction between the 
tenant and the adjacent tenant, but the New Jersey Superior 
Court held: 
"The law of l a n d l o r d and tenant , including 
t h a t r e l a t i n g to c o n s t r u c t i v e e v i c t i o n , has 
undergone c o n s i d e r a b l e change in recent years . 
In Res te R e a l t y Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 
456-457 , 251 A. 2d 268 (1969), the court s tated 
t h a t w h e r e t h e r e i s a c o v e n a n t of q u i e t 
enjoyment, whether expressed or implied, which is 
b reached s u b s t a n t i a l l y by the l a n d l o r d , the 
d o c t r i n e of constructive eviction i s available as 
a remedy for the t e n a n t ; and t h a t any act or 
omiss ion of t he landlord or anyone acting under 
h i s a u t h o r i t y w h i c h r e n d e r s the p r emi se s 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y u n s u i t a b l e for t he purpose for 
w h i c h t h e y a r e l e a s e d , or which s e r i o u s l y 
i n t e r f e r e s wi th the beneficial enjoyment of the 
p r e m i s e s , i s a b reach of t h a t covenant and 
c o n s t i t u t e s a c o n s t r u c t i v e e v i c t i o n of t he 
tenant ." (Id. at 853-854.) 
S ince n o i s e may c o n s t i t u t e a construct ive 
e v i c t i o n , t he c o u r t de t e rmined t h a t excessive 
n o i s e could a l s o c o n s t i t u t e a b reach of t he 
covenant of hab i t ab i l i t y . . . . 
We ag ree wi th the r e a s o n i n g of Millbridge 
Apar tments v. L inden . A number of recent cases 
from o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s have recognized that a 
l a n d l o r d may c o n s t r u c t i v e l y e v i c t a tenant by 
f a i l i n g to p r e v e n t o t h e r t e n a n t s from making 
e x c e s s i v e a m o u n t s of n c i s e . B l a c k e t t v. 
Olanof f, 371 Mass. 714, 358 N.E.2d 817 (Sup. Jud. 
C t . 19 7 7 ) ; C o l o n i a l Court A p a r t m e n t s , Inc. v. 
Kern, 282 Minn. 533 , 163 N.W.2d 770 (Sup. Ct. 
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1 9 6 8 ) ; Cohen v . W e r n e r , 82 M i s c . 2d 2 9 5 , 368 
N . Y . S . 2 d 1005 ( C i v . Ct . 1975), a f f ' d 85 Misc. 2d 
3 4 1 , 378 N . Y . S . 2 d 868 (App. Term. 1975). Accord 
R e s t a t e m e n t , P r o p e r t y 2d (Landlord and Tenant ) , 
Sec. 6 . 1 , comment d at 226 (1977). 
We h o l d t h a t i n o r d e r t o j u s t i f y e a r l y 
t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e l e a s e , or for t h a t matter an 
a b a t e m e n t of r e n t , the t enan t must show t h a t the 
n o i s e or c o n d u c t of a co tenant made the premises 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y u n s u i t a b l e for ordinary r e s i d e n t i a l 
l i v i n g and t h a t i t was wi th in the l a n d l o r d f s power 
t o a b a t e t h e n u i s a n c e . The t e s t i s o b j e c t i v e ; 
t h e n o i s e or d i s r u p t i v e conduct "must be such as 
t r u l y t o r e n d e r the premises un inhab i t ab l e in the 
eyes of a reasonable pe r son . " " ( Id . a t 854.) . 
I n B r u c k n e r v . H e l f a e r , 222 N.W. 790 (Wis. 1929) the 
C o u r t r e v i e w e d a claim of a t enan t t h a t too much noise from 
an a d j a c e n t t enan t caused him to vacate h i s apar tment . The 
C o u r t h e l d t h a t t h i s d i s tu rbance c o n s t i t u t e d a c o n s t r u c t i v e 
e v i c t i o n of the t e n a n t . The Court s t a t e d : 
" . . . The g e n e r a l r u l e , as s t a t e d in 16 
R u l i n g Case Law, 949, i s : "Where a l and lord * * * 
i s g u i l t y of such ac t s as w i l l j u s t i f y or warrant 
t h e t e n a n t i n l e a v i n g t h e p r e m i s e s , and he 
a b a n d o n s t h e m , t h e n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s which 
j u s t i f y such abandonmen t i t s e l f , w i l l support a 
p lea of e v i c t i o n as aga ins t an ac t ion for r e n t . " " 
In Wade v . H e r n d l , 127 Wis . 544, 107 N.W. 4 (1906), 
t h e C o u r t h e l d t h a t shaking and v i b r a t i o n caused by a c t s of 
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an adjacent tenant made the tenant f s room unsuitable for the 
p u r p o s e s for which i t was leased to her because she could 
n o t c o n t i n u e t o p a i n t on g l a s s (as an a r t i s t ) . The 
d i s t u r b a n c e c o n s t i t u t e d a c o n s t r u c t i v e eviction for the 
r ea son t h a t t he room was not sui table for the purposes for 
which i t was leased. 
In Lay v. B e n n e t t , 4 Colo. App. 252, 35 P. 748 (Colo. 
1894) t h e Court held t h a t t he l e a s i n g of premises above 
t h o s e of t he complaining tenant to tenants for the purpose 
of p r o s t i t u t i o n cons t i tu ted a constructive eviction of the 
complaining tenant . 
In Maple T e r r a c e Apartment Co. v. Simpson, 22 S.W.2d 
6 98 (Texas 1929), the Court held that the act of a cotenant 
in keeping a dog in i t s apartment contrary to the provisions 
of t he l e a s e p r o h i b i t i n g t he keep ing of animals on the 
p remises and the fa i lure of the landlord to take such action 
a s was r e q u i r e d to remove the dog from the p remises 
const i tuted constructive eviction of the complaining tenant. 
Applying the law to the facts of the case at hand, the 
Defendants respectful ly submit that the facts of the case at 
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hand compel a conclusion t h a t Defendants were c o n s t r u c t i v e l y 
ev ic ted from the premises . 
The c o n d u c t of I n t e r m o u n t a i n Marketing rendered the 
p r e m i s e s u n s u i t a b l e f o r t h e p u r p o s e for which they were 
l e a s e d , i . e . a d i g n i f i e d o f f i c e i n which the Defendants 
c o u l d c o n d u c t t h e i r b u s i n e s s , s e r v i c e c l i e n t s , and s e l l 
i n s u r a n c e t o p r o s p e c t i v e c l i e n t s . Defendants requi red an 
o f f i c e which e v i d e n c e d an a t m o s p h e r e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h 
d i g n i t y , t r u s t , p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m and s u b s t a n t i a l i t y . (R. 
514, 681-682, 689) 
I n t h e Memorandum Decision rendered by the t r i a l c o u r t , 
the t r i a l cour t found t h a t t h e : 
" . . . n o i s e made by Intermountain Marketing 
was d i s t r a c t i n g to defendants . . . [ b u t ] was not of 
s u f f i c i e n t magnitude to warrant abandonment. . . " 
(R. 279) 
T h e t r i a l c o u r t was o b l i g a t e d t o make f i n d i n g s 
r e g a r d i n g t h e n o i s e and t h e l e v e l of d i s t r a c t i o n t o 
Defendants but i t f a i l e d to do so . 
However , t h e fu r the r s ta tement made by the t r i a l cour t 
i n f e r r i n g t h a t a c t u a l l o s s of b u s i n e s s had t o be 
d e m o n s t r a t e d t o w a r r a n t abandonment demonstrated t h a t the 
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t r i a l c o u r t a p p l i e d an incorrect standard in rendering i t s 
d e c i s i o n concerning constructive evic t ion. The t r i a l court 
in i t s Memorandum Decision s ta ted : 
" F u r t h e r m o r e , no ev idence was presented to 
t h e Court t h a t as a r e s u l t of the noise and the 
o t h e r alleged cumulative acts of P la in t i f f s caused 
d e f e n d a n t s any loss of business or damages," (R. 
279-280) 
Defendants p r e s e n t e d s u b s t a n t i a l , u n c o n t r a v e r t e d 
e v i d e n c e t h a t t he noise and other conduct of Intermountain 
Marketing and P la in t i f f s caused the premises to be no longer 
sui table for the purposes for which they were leased. 
The r e q u i r e m e n t imposed by the t r i a l c o u r t t h a t 
Defendants must d e m o n s t r a t e a c t u a l b u s i n e s s losses and 
damages i s not t he appropriate legal t e s t for constructive 
e v i c t i o n and i s not required under the Utah decisions or the 
common law on the subject . 
The impact of t he f a c t s in the case a t hand is so 
s i m i l a r t o t h e impac t of t he f a c t s in T h i r t e e n t h & 
Washington STS. Corp. v . Nelsen, 123 Utah 70, 254 P2d 847 
( 1 9 5 3 ) , as to make the case p rac t i ca l ly control l ing in the 
case a t hand. In addit ion, the problems associated with the 
n o i s e and s h o u t i n g , the use of the ha l l s and the lack of 
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p a r k i n g space appear to accentuate the need for re l ie f in 
the case at hand. 
In a r e c e n t case dec ided by the Utah Supreme Court, 
Bruqqer v. F o n o t i , 645 P. 2d 647 (Utah 1982 ) , t he Utah 
Supreme Court reviewed the memorandum decision of the t r i a l 
c o u r t which stated that the main concern in the case was the 
d i s c o in the b u i l d i n g . As to the disco, the t r i a l court 
observed: 
" " I f ind t h a t the disco was a disturbance, but in 
r e l a t i o n to the t o t a l operaton of the cafe, the 
n o i s e and the k i d s in the hal l would have a very 
l i m i t e d e f f e c t on the d e f e n d a n t s 1 operat ion."" 
(Id. at 648.) 
I t s h o u l d a l s o be obse rved t h a t in Bruqqer , t h e 
r e s t a u r a n t , which claimed constructive evic t ion, was behind 
in t h e r e n t when i t vacated the premises in August, had not 
pa id t h e u t i l i t y b i l l s s i n c e A p r i l , and had remained in 
pos se s s ion of the property for approximately 10 months after 
the disco had taken possession of the space below. 
In the case at hand, after the disturbances and parking 
problems s t a r t e d , Defendants compla ined to P l a i n t i f f s . 
P l a i n t i f f s took a c t i o n from time to time to a l l ev i a t e the 
p r o b l e m s . The p r o b l e m s w h i c h e x i s t e d d e c r e a s e d 
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s u b s t a n t i a l l y , in some i n s t a n c e s , a f t e r P la in t i f f s took 
a c t i o n . Near t he end of the year 1981, and the f i r s t part 
of t h e year 1982, the problems inc reased subs tan t ia l ly . 
Defendants aga in complained but P la in t i f f s did nothing to 
a l l e v i a t e the problems. Defendants gave P la in t i f f s adequate 
n o t i c e and t ime to r e s o l v e the problems and when no 
r e s o l u t i o n occurred Defendants gave f inal notice and vacated 
t he p r e m i s e s . When Defendants vacated the building, a l l 
rental due was paid. 
POINT NO. Ill 
PLAINTIFFS BREACHED THE LEASE AGREEMENT 
BY NOT PROVIDING THE REQUIRED ALLOTTED 
PARKING AND THEIR PRIOR BREACH EXCUSED 
DEFENDANTS FROM PERFORMANCE UNDER THE 
TERMS OF THE LEASE AGREEMENT AND/OR 
CONSTITUTED A CONSTRUCTIVE EVICTION OF 
DEFENDANTS. 
I n t h e c a s e a t hand , t h e l e a s e agreement p r o v i d e d fo r a 
s p e c i f i c number of p a r k i n g s p a c e s which were t o be a l l o c a t e d 
t o D e f e n d a n t s . The a p p l i c a b l e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e l e a s e 
agreement a r e as f o l l o w s : 
" 8 . P a r k i n g : L a n d l o r d s h a l l p r o v i d e 
o f f - s t r e e t p a r k i n g f o r 12 a u t o m o b i l e s . In t h e 
e v e n t t h a t p a r k i n g i s r e s e r v e d i n t h e cove red 
p a r k i n g a r e a , t e n a n t w i l l be a l l o t t e d h i s 
p r o p o r t i o n a l s h a r e i n a d d i t i o n t o a c c e s s t o a l l 
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n o n - c o v e r e d , unreserved parking that is available 
for a l l tenants use." 
P l a i n t i f f s d i d n o t t a k e any a c t i o n to a s s u r e 
Defendants ' use of the i r a l lo t t ed parking space. p l a i n t i f f s 
d id not d e s i g n a t e p a r k i n g spaces, did not a l l o t or assign 
n u m b e r s , did not p o l i c e t he p a r k i n g l o t and took the 
p o s i t i o n that no parking problem exis ted. (R. 446, 453-454, 
5 2 0 - 5 2 1 , 608, 6 4 1 , 669, 674, 679, 724, 729, 767, and 
Exhibits 26-P and 33-P). 
P l a i n t i f f s 1 f a i l u r e to take any action to provide the 
neces sa ry parking spaces for Defendants was in breach of the 
l e a s e agreement s p e c i f i c a l l y requir ing the a l locat ion of 
parking spaces for Defendants' use. 
At t he very l e a s t , P l a i n t i f f s ' f a i lu re to provide the 
n e c e s s a r y p a r k i n g spaces adds to Defendants' claims that 
P l a i n t i f f s ' c o n s t r u c t i v e l y e v i c t e d Defendants from the 
premises. 
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POINT NO. IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
PERMIT DEFENDANTS TO INTRODUCE TESTIMONY 
AS TO THE STANDARDS TO BE MAINTAINED BY 
DEFENDANTS IN THEIR LEASED PREMISES, 
I n T h i r t e e n t h & W a s h i n g t o n STS. Corp . v . N e l s e n , 123 
U t a h 7 0 , 254 P . 2d 847 ( 1 9 5 3 ) , t h e Utah Supreme Cour t made i t 
c l e a r t h a t t h e o c c u p a n t s of t h e p r e m i s e s a r e e n t i t l e d t o 
h a v e t h e p r e m i s e s m a i n t a i n e d in such a c o n d i t i o n as t o be 
f i t f o r t h e pu rpose fo r which t h e y were l e a s e d and so as t o 
b e c o n d u c i v e t o t h e c o n d u c t of t h e i r b u s i n e s s i n a 
p r o f e s s i o n a l manner . 
D u r i n g t h e t r i a l , t h e Defendan t s c a l l e d Tony Supanc ic 
f r o m D e f e n d a n t s 1 n a t i o n a l h e a d q u a r t e r s , as a w i t n e s s t o 
t e s t i f y c o n c e r n i n g t h e s t a n d a r d s w h i c h t h e D e f e n d a n t s 
m a i n t a i n a n d r e q u i r e n a t i o n w i d e c o n c e r n i n g t h e i r l e a s e h o l d 
p r e m i s e s . Tony Supanc ic hand led a l l l e a s i n g agreements fo r 
D e f e n d a n t s a n d had n e g o t i a t e d a n d c o n c l u d e d t h e l e a s e 
a g r e e m e n t w h i c h i s t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r of t h i s a c t i o n . (R. 
509 , 6 8 1 , 685) 
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The t r i a l c o u r t r e fu sed to pe rmi t Tony Supancic to 
t e s t i f y as to the standards required local ly and nationwide. 
(R. 691) 
The Defendants made a proffer of the testimony which 
would have been introduced had the t r i a l court permitted the 
Tony Supancic to t e s t i f y . (R. 691-693) 
I t i s clear from the testimony which was introduced and 
p e r m i t t e d a t t h e t ime of the t r i a l of the above-captioned 
m a t t e r t h a t the P l a i n t i f f s 1 f a i l e d t o p r o v i d e l e a s e d 
premises which met the standards required. (R. 514) 
Had t h e t r i a l court permitted Tony Supancic to t e s t i f y , 
h i s t e s t i m o n y would have demonstrated that Defendants were 
j u s t i f i e d in vacating the premises because of the potent ia l 
loss of business and damage to the Defendants. 
The t r i a l c o u r t ' s decision in th i s regard const i tuted 
revers ib le e r ro r . 
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POINT NO- V 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO REQUIRE THE 
PLAINTIFFS TO MAKE AN ELECTION OF THE 
REMEDY WHICH THEY SOUGHT AT TRIAL. 
I n t h e e v e n t of a d e f a u l t on t h e p a r t of D e f e n d a n t s , 
P l a i n t i f f s c o u l d h a v e e l e c t e d t o t e r m i n a t e t h e l e a s e 
a g r e e m e n t a n d r e l y u p o n t h e i r common law r emed ie s o u t s i d e 
t h e t e r m s of t h e l e a s e a g r e e m e n t , or t h e y c o u l d have e l e c t e d 
o n e of t h e t h r e e a l t e r n a t i v e c o u r s e s of a c t i o n or r emed ies 
p u r s u a n t t o t h e t e rms of t h e l e a s e a g r e e m e n t . 
At t h e commencement of t r i a l , t h e Defendan t s r e q u e s t e d 
t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t r e q u i r e t h e P l a i n t i f f s t o make t h e 
e l e c t i o n as t o which p o s i t i o n t h e y were go ing t o t a k e d u r i n g 
t h e c o u r s e of t h e t r i a l . D e f e n d a n t s 1 mot ion was d e n i e d . 
I n F a r m e r s & M e r c h . Bank v . U n i v e r s a l C . I . T . C r e d i t 
C o r p . , 4 U t a h 2d 1 5 5 , 289 P . 2 d 1 0 4 5 ( 1 9 5 5 ) , t h e U t a h 
Supreme Cour t made t h e f o l l o w i n g s t a t e m e n t : 
"The d o c t r i n e of e l e c t i o n of r emed ies a p p l i e s 
a s a b a r o n l y w h e r e t h e t w o a c t i o n s a r e 
i n c o n s i s t e n t , g e n e r a l l y based upon i n c o m p a t i b l e 
f a c t s ; t h e d o c t r i n e d o e s n o t o p e r a t e a s an 
e s t o p p e l w h e r e t h e two or more r emed ie s a r e g iven 
t o r e d r e s s t h e same w r o n g and a r e c o n s i s t e n t . 
Where t h e r e m e d i e s a f f o r d e d a r e i n c o n s i s t e n t , i t 
i s t h e e l e c t i o n of o n e t h a t b a r s t h e o t h e r ; bu t 
w h e r e t h e y a r e c o n s i s t e n t , i t i s t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n 
t h a t o p e r a t e s a s a b a r . " ( I d . a t 1049 . ) 
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In Cook v . C o v e y - B a l l a r d Motor Co. , 69 Utah 161, 253 
P. 196 (1927), the Utah Supreme Court s t a t e d : 
" I t i s w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t one who i s induced 
t o make a s a l e or t r ade by the d e c e i t of a vendee 
has t h e c h o i c e of two remedies upon h i s d iscovery 
of t h e f r a u d ; he may aff i rm the c o n t r a c t and sue 
f o r h i s damages , or he may resc ind i t and sue for 
t h e p r o p e r t y he has sold or what he has paid out 
on t h e c o n t r a c t . The former remedy counts upon 
t h e af f i rmance or v a l i d i t y of the t r a n s a c t i o n , the 
l a t t e r r e p u d i a t e s the t r a n s a c t i o n and counts upon 
i t s i n v a l i d i t y . T h e t w o r e m e d i e s a r e 
i n c o n s i s t e n t , and t h e c h o i c e of one r e j e c t s the 
o t h e r , because the sa le cannot be v a l i d and void 
a t t h e same t ime. . . . [ c i t a t i o n omi t ted] . . . 
T h e r e t h u s were open t o him a t t h a t time two 
c o e x i s t i n g r e m e d i e s , which were a l t e r n a t i v e and 
i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h e a c h o t h e r , a n d , when t h e 
p l a i n t i f f e l e c t e d t h e one as he d i d , the o ther 
was no longer a v a i l a b l e . ( Id . a t 199.) 
• • • 
T h e d o c t r i n e of an e l e c t i o n r e s t s upon t h e 
p r i n c i p l e t h a t o n e may n o t t a k e c o n t r a r y 
p o s i t i o n s , and where he has a r i g h t to choose one 
of t w o modes of r e d r e s s , and t h e two a r e so 
i n c o n s i s t e n t t h a t the a s s e r t i o n of one involves a 
n e g a t i o n o r r e p u d i a t i o n of t h e o t h e r , t h e 
d e l i b e r a t e a n d s e t t l e d c h o i c e of o n e , w i t h 
k n o w l e d g e or means of knowledge of such f a c t s as 
would a u t h o r i z e a r e s o r t to each, w i l l prec lude 
him t h e r e a f t e r from going back and e l e c t i n g aga in . 
. . . " (Id^ a t 200.) 
I n Roya l R e s o u r c e s v . G i b r a l t e r F in . Corp . , 60 3 P. 2d 
793 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court s t a t e d : 
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"The d o c t r i n e of e l e c t i o n of remedies is a 
t e c h n i c a l rule of procedure and i t s purpose is not 
to p r e v e n t recourse to any remedy, but to prevent 
double r e d r e s s for a single wrong. Said doctrine 
p r e s u p p o s e s a c h o i c e between i n c o n s i s t e n t 
r e m e d i e s , a knowledgeab le s e l e c t i o n of one 
t h e r e o f , free of fraud or imposition, and a resor t 
t o the chosen remedy evincing a purpose to forego 
a l l o the r s . " (Id^ at 796.) 
In C o s t e l l o v. K a s t e l e r , 7 Utah 2d 310, 324 P.2d 772 
( 1 9 5 8 ) , the Utah Supreme Court recognized the pr inciple that 
a P a r t y cannot have a judgment a g a i n s t an agent and an 
u n d i s c l o s e d p r i n c i p a l and t h a t t he p a r t y s e e k i n g such 
judgment must e lec t to hold one or the other . 
In the case a t hand, the l e a s e agreement contains a 
p r o v i s i o n governing the P l a in t i f f s 1 r igh ts in the event of a 
d e f a u l t by D e f e n d a n t s . The a p p l i c a b l e p rov is ion i s as 
follows: 
" 1 9 . DEFAULT IN RENT, INSOLVENCY OF 
TENANT: If t e n a n t s h a l l make d e f a u l t in the 
payment of t he r e n t reserved hereunder, . . .and 
any such d e f a u l t s h a l l continue for a period of 
t en (10) d a y s , after writ ten notice to Tenant, or 
i f t he lease premises or any part thereof shal l be 
abandoned or vaca ted . . . , then Landlord, in 
a d d i t i o n to any o t h e r r i g h t s or remedies i t may 
h a v e , s h a l l have the immediate r ight of re-entry 
and may remove a l l persons and property from the 
p r e m i s e s . . . .Land lo rd may e l e c t to re -en te r , 
a s h e r e i n p r o v i d e d , o r L a n d l o r d may t ake 
p o s s e s s i o n p u r s u a n t to th i s Lease and r e l e t said 
p r e m i s e s or any p a r t t h e r e o f for such term or 
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t e rms . . . and at such renta l or ren ta ls and upon 
such o t h e r terms as Landlord in the exercise of 
Landlord fs sole discre t ion may deem advisable with 
t h e r i g h t t o make a l t e ra t ions and repairs to said 
p r e m i s e s . Upon each such r e l e t t i n g , Tenant shal l 
be i m m e d i a t e l y l i a b l e for and s h a l l pay to 
L a n d l o r d , in a d d i t i o n to any indeb tedness due 
h e r e u n d e r , t h e c o s t s and expenses of such 
r e l e t t i n g i n c l u d i n g advertising cos t s , brokerage 
f e e s , any reasonable a t to rney ' s fees incurred and 
t h e c o s t of such a l t e ra t ions and repairs incurred 
by L a n d l o r d , and the amount, if any, by which the 
r e n t reserved in th i s Lease for the period of such 
r e l e t t i n g . . • exceeds the amount agreed to be 
pa id as r e n t for the premises for said period by 
such r e l e t t i n g . . . . No such re-entry or taking 
p o s s e s s i o n of the p remises by Landlord shal l be 
c o n s t r u e d a s an e l e c t i o n by L a n d l o r d to 
t e r m i n a t e t h i s Lease u n l e s s t h e t e r m i n a t i o n 
t h e r e o f be d e c r e e d by a c o u r t of competent j u r i s d i c t i o n or s t a t e d s p e c i f i c a l l y by the 
L a n d l o r d i n w r i t i n g a d d r e s s e d to Tenan t . 
N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g any such r e l e t t i n g w i t h o u t 
t e r m i n a t i o n , Landlord may at any time thereaf ter 
e l e c t t o t e r m i n a t e t h i s Lease for such previous 
b r e a c h . Should Landlord a t any time terminate 
t h i s Lease for any b r e a c h , in a d d i t i o n to any 
o t h e r remedy Landlord may have , Landlord may 
r e c o v e r from Tenant a l l damages Landlord may incur 
by r eason of such b r e a c h , including the cost of 
r ecover ing the premises including a t to rney ' s fees , 
c o u r t cos t s , and storage charges and including the 
worth a t t h e t ime of such t e r m i n a t i o n of the 
e x c e s s , i f any, of the amount of rent and charges 
e q u i v a l e n t to rent reserved in th i s Lease for the 
r e m a i n d e r of t he s t a t e d term over t h e then 
c h a r g e a b l e rent on the premises for the remainder 
of t h e s t a t e d term, a l l of which amounts shal l be 
i m m e d i a t e l y due and payab le from Tenant to 
Landlord. . . . " [Emphasis added.] 
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As the f o r e g o i n g p r o v i s i o n s in the l e a s e c l e a r l y 
i n d i c a t e , t he P l a i n t i f f had two (2) a l t e rna t ive remedies 
which i t could have pursued which were mutually exclusive 
and the cho i ce of one of which precluded the choice of the 
other as follows: 
1. Re-enter the premises, make a l t e ra t ions and repairs 
and r e - l e t t he p r emise s and commence a c t i o n a g a i n s t 
Defendants for the costs incurred by P la in t i f f s as specified 
in the d e f a u l t c l a u s e of the lease agreement and for the 
difference between: 
The " a m o u n t , if any, by which the r e n t 
r e s e r v e d in t h i s Lease for the p e r i o d of such 
r e l e t t i n g . . . exceeds the amount agreed to be 
pa id as r e n t for the premises for said period by 
such r e l e t t i n g . " (Lease Agreement, Para. 19) 
2. Te rmina te the lease agreement, and sue for damages 
i n c u r r e d in the breach as specified in the default clause of 
the lease agreement, and for the difference between: 
The "worth at the time of such termination of 
t h e e x c e s s , i f any, of t he amount of rent and 
c h a r g e s equiva len t to rent reserved in th i s Lease 
for t h e then remainder of the stated term over the 
then c h a r g e a b l e r e n t on the p r emise s for the 
r e m a i n d e r of the s t a t e d t e rm. . . " (Lease 
Agreement, Para. 19) 
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3 , A c c o r d i n g t o t h e terms of the Lease agreement and 
t h e common law a p p l i c a b l e , t h e t r i a l c o u r t c o u l d have 
d e t e r m i n e d t h a t P l a i n t i f f s 1 c o n d u c t amoun ted t o a 
t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e l e a s e agreement, thus c r e a t i n g a t h i r d 
a l t e r n a t i v e . 
A l t e r n a t i v e No. 2 was e i t h e r no t a v a i l a b l e t o 
P l a i n t i f f s , b e c a u s e P l a i n t i f f s d i d n o t i n t r o d u c e any 
e v i d e n c e as t o t h e "chargeable r e n t " or f a i r market r e n t a l 
v a l u e of t h e p r e m i s e s , or t he r e were no damages a v a i l a b l e 
because the the common law presumes: 
" . . . the l e s s o r w i l l be able to r e - r e n t the 
l e a s e d p r e m i s e s f o r t h e amount of the reserved 
r e n t w i t h o u t l o s s or damage." C D . Stimson Co. 
v. P o r t e r , 195 F.2d 410, 413 (10th C i r . 1952) 
In t h e c a s e a t hand , p r i o r to the commencement of the 
t r i a l , t h e D e f e n d a n t s moved f o r an o rder to r e q u i r e the 
P l a i n t i f f s t o e l e c t t h e remedy which the P l a i n t i f f s would 
s e e k a t t h e t r i a l . (R. 398) The r e q u e s t was made in 
w r i t t e n form s u p p o r t e d by a Memorandum and was made o r a l l y 
t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t . (R. 339) The t r i a l c o u r t did not 
r e q u i r e such an e l e c t i o n to be made. (R. 400) 
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L a t e r , the t r i a l court s tated that i t might require the 
P l a i n t i f f s t o make an e l e c t i o n of remedy. (R. 788) The 
P l a i n t i f f s f a i l e d to do so and the t r i a l court stated that 
i t would make the elect ion for the P l a i n t i f f s . (R. 790) 
In the Memorandum Dec i s ion issued by the t r i a l court 
the following statement i s made: 
"Defendan t s 1 Motion to require p l a in t i f f s to 
e l e c t remedy i s d e n i e d . P l a i n t i f f s ' remedy for 
abandonment i s s e t f o r t h in Paragraph 19 of the 
Lease d a t e d the 15th day of September , 1980. 
P l a i n t i f f s do not claim in the i r Amended Complaint 
t h a t t h e y t e r m i n a t e d the l e a s e and no such 
e v i d e n c e was p r e s e n t e d . P l a i n t i f f s , in effect , 
e l e c t e d t h e i r remedy by not giving writ ten notice 
to defendants terminating the l ease . " (R. 279) 
The t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g t h a t P l a i n t i f f s 1 conduct 
c o n s t i t u t e d an elect ion not to terminate the lease agreement 
r e q u i r e s the l o g i c a l conclusion that P la in t i f f s therefore 
e l e c t e d to p roceed under a l t e r n a t i v e No. 1 of the lease 
ag reemen t . P l a i n t i f f s 1 damages would t h e r e f o r e be the 
d i f f e r e n c e between the lease agreement ra te with Defendants 
and P l a i n t i f f s 1 l e a s e agreement ra te with the new tenant, 
Intermountain Marketing. 
The t r i a l c o u r t ' s conc lus ion that P la in t i f f s did not 
t e r m i n a t e the l e a s e because P l a i n t i f f s did not introduce 
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e v i d e n c e of a w r i t t e n n o t i c e of t e r m i n a t i o n f a i l e d to 
a d d r e s s t h e i s s u e of whether or not as a matter of law, 
P l a i n t i f f s 1 conduct const i tuted a termination of the lease 
agreement. 
Since the t r i a l court concluded that P la in t i f f s elected 
t h e i r remedy under Paragraph 19 of the Lease agreement, the 
t r i a l c o u r t was obliged to r e s t r i c t i t s award to P la in t i f f s 
to the remedy elected by P l a i n t i f f s . 
Not only did i t c o n s t i t u t e r e v e r s i b l e error for the 
t r i a l c o u r t t o refuse to require P la in t i f f s to e lec t the i r 
remedy p r i o r to t h e commencement of t r i a l so Defendants 
could present a defense to the elected remedy, but a l so , the 
award of damages and the re l ie f granted by the Court was not 
p e r m i t t e d by the default clause of the Lease agreement, i . e . 
an award of a l l t he f u t u r e unaccrued renta l due under the 
te rms of the l e a s e agreement. The judgment must therefore 
be reversed. 
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POINT NO. VI 
THE JUDGMENT RENDERED IN BEHALF OF 
PLAINTIFFS AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS 
I S VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
A. AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE COURT 
MUST CONCLUDE THAT THE LANDLORD 
E X E R C I S E D DOMINION OVER THE 
PREMISES TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE 
TENANT AND THAT CONDUCT OF THE 
LANDLORD TERMINATED THE LEASE 
AGREEMENT. 
I n W i l l i s v . K r o n e n d o n k , 58 U t a h 5 9 2 , 200 P. 1025 
( 1 9 2 1 ) , t h e Utah Supreme Cour t s t a t e d : 
" I t h a s s o f r e q u e n t l y b e e n h e l d by t h e 
c o u r t s a f o r e s a i d t h a t in c a s e a t e n a n t s u r r e n d e r s 
t h e p r e m i s e s t o h i s l a n d l o r d b e f o r e t h e end of 
t h e t e r m , a n d b e f o r e any of t h e r e n t i s due and 
p a y a b l e , t h e t e n a n t i s r e l e a s e d or d i s c h a r g e d 
f r o m t h e p a y m e n t of a l l r e n t , a n d t h a t t h e 
l a n d l o r d i s w i t h o u t a remedy, t h a t t h e r u l e has 
p r a c t i c a l l y b e c o m e e l e m e n t a r y . The d o c t r i n e i s 
l i k e w i s e s t a t e d by a l l t h e t e x t - w r i t e r s on 
Land lo rd and T e n a n t . " ( I d ^ a t 1027-1028) 
11
 . . . t h e courts are a l l agreed tha t , where 
t h e r e is a surrender by a tenant and an acceptance 
by the l a n d l o r d , as in the case at bar, no action 
can be m a i n t a i n e d by the l a n d l o r d a f t e r such 
s u r r e n d e r for any rent not due and payable at or 
b e f o r e the s u r r e n d e r went i n t o effect , that in 
case of s u r r e n d e r the landlord can only maintain 
an ac t ion for the rent that was due and payable at 
t h e t ime of the s u r r e n d e r , and that in case of 
s u r r e n d e r before the rent i s payable there can be 
no appo r t i onmen t of the r e n t . So f a r as the 
w r i t e r i s a d v i s e d t h e r e are no decisions to the 
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c o n t r a r y . None have been c i t e d , and the w r i t e r , 
a f t e r making d i l i g e n t sea rch , has not found any ." 
( Id . a t 1029. ) 
" A s s u m i n g , h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e r e had been 
m e r e l y an a b a n d o n m e n t of t h e p r e m i s e s by the 
d e f e n d a n t , t h e n t h e r e s u l t , i n v iew of t h e 
u n d i s p u t e d f a c t s , would s t i l l have t o be the 
s a m e . As p o i n t e d o u t in t h e c a s e c i t e d from 
C a l i f o r n i a , where a t enan t abandons the premises , 
a n d t h e l a n d l o r d u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y g o e s i n t o 
p o s s e s s i o n the reof and t r e a t s them as though the 
t e n a n c y had e x p i r e d , i t amounts to a su r r ende r , 
and t h e l a n d l o r d c a n n o t t h e r e a f t e r recover any 
r e n t , nor sue f o r d a m a g e s . I f he d e s i r e s to 
r e s e r v e t h a t r i g h t , he must r e c o g n i z e t h e 
t e n a n t ' s r i g h t s in the premises for the unexpired 
t e r m , and sue him for damages upon h i s breach of 
c o v e n a n t t o p a y r e n t . T h i s , h o w e v e r , i s 
elementary d o c t r i n e . " ( Id . a t 1030.) 
The Utah Supreme Court followed the same r u l i n g in the 
l a t e r c a s e of B e l a n g e r v . R i c e , 2 Utah 2d 250, 272 P.2d 
173 (1954). In t h a t c a se , the Court s t a t e d : 
"A s u r r e n d e r may t ake p lace where t h e r e i s 
an e x p r e s s a g r e e m e n t of t h e p a r t i e s or by 
o p e r a t i o n of l a w . T h e r e i s no evidence of an 
e x p r e s s a g r e e m e n t , and h e n c e we must examine 
t h o s e e l e m e n t s which m i g h t g i v e r i s e t o a 
s u r r e n d e r by o p e r a t i o n of law. As s t a t e d in 32 
Am. J u r . , Landlord and Tenant, Sec. 905: 
"A s u r r e n d e r of a l e a s e by 
o p e r a t i o n of law r e s u l t s from a c t s which 
i m p l y m u t u a l consent independent of the 
e x p r e s s e d i n t e n t i o n of the p a r t i e s t h a t 
t h e i r a c t s s h a l l have t h a t e f f e c t ; i t i s 
by way of e s t o p p e l . However , t h e 
i n t e n t i o n of the land lord to accept the 
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t e n a n t ' s s u r r e n d e r of t he premises is 
i m p o r t a n t on the question of surrender 
by o p e r a t i o n of law, and a surrender 
w i l l not be imp l i ed against the in tent 
of t he p a r t i e s , as manifested by thei r 
ac t s ; * * *" (Id. at 174.) 
" I t i s fundamenta l t h a t where a t e n a n t 
s u r r e n d e r s and the landlord accepts the premises 
d u r i n g the term of the lease , the landlord cannot 
r e c o v e r r e n t not due and payable at the time of 
the surrender." (Id. at 175.) 
In John C. C u t l e r A s s o c i a t i o n v. De Jay Stores, 3 
Utah 2d 107, 279 P.2d 700 (1955), the question of whether or 
not t h e a c t s of t h e p a r t i e s demonstrated a surrender and 
a c c e p t a n c e of the su r r ende r by the Landlord was reviewed. 
The Supreme Court s ta ted : 
" I t i s only when he [the landlord] exercises 
dominion over the premises beyond those purposes 
and incons is ten t with the r ights of a tenant whom 
he seeks to hold for the renta l of the premises, 
t h a t a f i n d i n g of s u r r e n d e r i s j u s t i f i e d . " 
(Id. at 702. ) 
The Court then ind ica ted that there was a confl ic t of 
a u t h o r i t i e s as t o " the r u l e of law to be a p p l i e d in 
d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r a r e l e t t i n g w i l l t e r m i n a t e the 
o b l i g a t i o n s of a l ease . " After reviewing the three schools 
of t hough t on the s u b j e c t , the Utah Supreme Court adopted 
the following ru le : 
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"We b e l i e v e that the th i rd rule referred to 
by the C o n n e c t i c u t court , suggesting that there 
i s no a r b i t r a r y s t a n d a r d to be i n v a r i a b l y 
a p p l i e d , b e s t l e n d s i t s e l f in doing jus t i ce in-
such cont rovers ies , and therefore al ine ourselves 
with i t . 
The q u e s t i o n of surrender , being generally 
one of f a c t as to what was the intention of the 
p a r t i e s , i s to be determined from a l l attendent 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n c l u d i n g t h e conduct and 
expressions of the p a r t i e s . " (Id. at 703.) 
The Supreme Court then indicated that when the lessor 
l e a s e d the p r o p e r t y to a n o t h e r t e n a n t , and such action 
c o n s t i t u t e d an exercise of dominion over the property to the 
e x c l u s i o n of the tenant , that such act terminated the lease 
agreement as we l l as any obligation to pay rent thereaf ter 
on the lease agreement. 
In F r i s c o J o e s , I n c . v. Peay, 5 58 P.2d 1327 (Utah 
1977), the Utah Supreme Court s ta ted : 
"As a g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n , where a tenant 
o f f e r s t o s u r r e n d e r a l e a s e and t h e landlord 
a g r e e s to accept the surrender, tha t extinguishes 
any l i a b i l i t y for rent after such surrender. But 
i t does not extinguish r ights which have accrued 
beforehand." (Id. at 1330.) 
In F r i s c o J o n e s , t h e Utah Supreme Court modified the 
judgment of the t r i a l court and held that any award for rent 
a c c r u i n g a f t e r the surrender of the lease and acceptance by 
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the landlord "never did become due. It is therefore 
necessary to reduce the judgment by that amount." (Id. at 
1330. ) 
Concern ing the intent ion of the landlord to accept the 
p r e m i s e s , 52 C . J . S . Landlord & Tenant Section 493 (2) at 
page 43 3 , makes reference to the school of thought that the 
i n t e n t i o n of the l a n d l o r d w i l l be c o n t r o l l i n g on the 
question of surrender of the premises. I t s t a t e s : 
" . . . Thus an a c c e p t a n c e will be implied 
w h e r e t h e l a n d l o r d t a k e s p o s s e s s i o n of t he 
p r e m i s e s and uses them for his own purposes, as 
w h e r e he r e m o d e l s them so as to make them 
u n a v a i l a b l e for the purposes for which they were 
l e a s e d and u n t e n a n t a b l e for the p e r i o d of 
r e m o d e l i n g , or where he r e l e t s them before the 
t e n a n t v a c a t e s , and ordinar i ly is implied where 
he tears down a l l the buildings on the premises. 
I t has a l s o been he ld t h a t an acceptance 
w i l l be implied where the landlord unqualifiedly 
t a k e s a b s o l u t e possession of the premises unless 
he e x p r e s s e s an intent ion to hold the lessee for 
r e n t or the lease authorizes such act ion. I t has 
f u r t h e r been a d j u d i c a t e d t h a t if the landlord 
wishes to p r e v e n t an acceptance by operation of 
law he must e i ther by word or ac t , convey to the 
t e n a n t ' s n o t i c e t h a t he is resuming possession 
for the t enan t ' s benefit and not his own benefi t , 
b u t , where the landlord ' s conduct i s inconsistent 
with h is notice that he is acting for the tenant , 
re-entry wil l be an acceptance." 
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In t he f a c t s -of t he case at hand, there is no dispute 
in the e v i d e n c e nor any evidence offered to dispprove the 
f o l l o w i n g p r o p o s i t i o n s which were c lear ly demonstrated by 
Defendan ts to show that P l a i n t i f f s , by the i r a c t s , accepted 
the surrender of the subject premises: 
1. That Defendants u n e q u i v o c a l l y s u r r e n d e r e d the 
premises to P l a i n t i f f s , 
2. That P l a i n t i f f s exe rc i sed immediate and absolute 
dominion and control over the premises. 
3 . That P l a i n t i f f s remodeled the premises and leased 
t h e e n t i r e portion of the premises to another tenant within 
a few weeks of the time Defendants surrendered the premises 
to P l a i n t i f f s . 
4. That P l a i n t i f f s have never tendered or offered to 
t e n d e r p o s s e s s i o n of t h e premises to Defendants from and 
a f t e r t h e d a t e Defendants s u r r e n d e r e d p o s s e s s i o n to 
P l a i n t i f f s . 
5 . T h a t f rom and a f t e r Defendants s u r r e n d e r e d 
p o s s e s s i o n of t he p r emise s to P l a i n t i f f s , the Defendants 
have never a t t e m p t e d or o f f e r e d to re-take possession or 
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dominion or c o n t r o l over t he p r e m i s e s surrendered, (R. 
•480-481) 
P l a i n t i f f s d i d n o t i n t r o d u c e any ev idence to 
d e m o n s t r a t e a w r i t t e n n o t i c e of e l e c t i o n of remedy and 
n o t i f i c a t i o n t h e r e o f to D e f e n d a n t s , but the ev idence 
d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t P l a i n t i f f s ' conduct, as a matter of law 
const i tuted an elect ion to terminate the lease agreement. 
The t r i a l cour t was obligated to make findings of fact 
concerning the surrender of the premises and the retaking of 
possession by P la in t i f f s and the legal effect thereof. 
The l e a s e agreement (concerning elect ion to terminate) 
r ecogn izes that the common law standards will be applied and 
s t a t e s : 
"No such r e - e n t r y or t a k i n g p o s s e s s i o n of the 
p r e m i s e s by the Landlord shal l be construed as an 
e l e c t i o n by Landlord to t e r m i n a t e t h i s Lease 
u n l e s s t h e t e r m i n a t i o n t h e r e o f be decreed by a 
c o u r t of c o m p e t e n t j u r i s d i c t i o n or s t a t e d 
s p e c i f i c a l l y by the Landlord in writing addressed 
to the Tenant. [Emphasis added.] 
S ince t h e e l e c t i o n to t e r m i n a t e the l e a s e is made 
e i t h e r by the Landlord expressly making such termination by 
w r i t t e n n o t i c e , or by a court declaring that the conduct of 
t h e Landlord const i tuted a termination, the t r i a l court was 
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o b l i g e d t o m a k e a s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g on t h i s i s s u e and was 
c o m p e l l e d b y t h e common law t o c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e c o n d u c t of 
t h e L a n d l o r d ( P l a i n t i f f s ) c o n s t i t u t e d a n e l e c t i o n t o 
t e r m i n a t e t h e l e a s e a s a m a t t e r of l a w . 
T h e F i n d i n g o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h a t t h e P l a i n t i f f s 
e l e c t e d a r e m e d y b y t h e i r c o n d u c t o t h e r t h a n t h e r emedy 
o f t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e l e a s e a g r e e m e n t i s u n s u b s t a n t i a t e d by 
a n y a s s e s s m e n t o f t h e f a c t s , e v e n t h o s e c o n s t r u e d m o s t 
f a v o r a b l y t o t h e r u l i n g of t h e t r i a l c o u r t . 
B . T H E J U D G M E N T OF THE T R I A L 
COURT IN SO FAR AS I T ORDERS AND 
REQUIRES THE DEFENDANTS TO MAKE 
PAYMENTS IN THE FUTURE FOR RENTS 
ACCRUING IN THE FUTURE MAY NOT BE 
SUSTAINED AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
1 . UNDER THE COMMON LAW, NO CLAIM CAN 
BE ASSERTED FOR RENTALS WHICH HAVE NOT 
ACCRUED PRIOR TO THE DATE OF THE FILING 
OF THE COMPLAINT, OR THE DATE OF THE 
TRIAL. 
A p p e l l a n t knows of no U t a h c a s e s d i r e c t l y on p o i n t , b u t 
t h e c o m m o n l a w r u l e o f d a m a g e s o n b r e a c h o f a l e a s e 
a g r e e m e n t i s s e t f o r t h i n C D . S t i m s o n Co. v . P o r t e r , 195 
F . 2 d 410 ( 1 0 t h C i r . 1 9 5 2 ) , a c a s e a r i s i n g i n t h e D i s t r i c t of 
U t a h . I n t h e o p i n i o n , t h e T e n t h C i r c u i t C o u r t s t a t e d : 
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". . . Like the t r i a l court and the p a r t i e s , 
o u r s e a r c h h a s not uncovered any Utah case 
p r e s c r i b i n g a formula for the ascertainment of 
damages r e s u l t i n g from an ant ic ipatory breach, or 
p r e m a t u r e t e r m i n a t i o n , of a l e a s e or r e n t a l 
c o n t r a c t . We a g r e e , t h e r e f o r e , with the t r i a l 
c o u r t t h a t the general rule i s to the effect that 
t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s damage i s measured by the 
d i f f e r e n c e between present value of reserved rent 
and t h e p r e s e n t f a i r r e n t a l va lue of the 
remainder , the two of which are presumed to be the 
same. . . . [Citat ions Omitted] In other words, 
i t i s presumed that in the event of a breach that 
t h e l e s s o r w i l l be a b l e to r e - r e n t the leased 
p r e m i s e s for the amount of t he r e s e r v e d r en t 
w i t h o u t loss or damage. But, t h i s presumption, as 
a l l o t h e r p r e s u m p t i o n s in law and fact , may be 
d i s s i p a t e d or r e b u t t e d by competent and relevant 
f a c t s . " (Id. at 413.) 
In Jones v. McQuesten, 172 Wash. 480, 20 P.2d 838 
(Wash. 1933 ) , the Washington Supreme Court in reviewing the 
question of damages on breach of a lease agreement s ta ted: 
". . . [D]amages a re measured , not by the 
amount of the rent reserved, but by the difference 
between t h a t amount and the renta l value of the 
premises to the end of the term.'1 (Id. at 840.) 
That r u l e of law, a p p e a r s to be consistent with the 
Utah d e c i s i o n s r e g a r d i n g damages for amounts to accrue in 
t h e f u t u r e . A p p e l l a n t r e s p e c t f u l l y submi ts t h a t t he 
J u d g m e n t of the t r i a l c o u r t i s not s u p p o r t e d by any 
e v i d e n c e a s t o t h e f a i r market r e n t a l va lue of the 
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p r e m i s e s , t he likelihood of r e l e t t i ng the premises and over 
what p e r i o d of t i m e , or any other evidence upon which the 
c o u r t could d e t e r m i n e the renta l value of the premises to 
the end of the term. 
In a s u i t for r e n t a l due , under the common law, the 
amount r e c o v e r a b l e i s l imi ted to renta l which had accrued 
e i t h e r p r i o r t o t h e date P la in t i f f s f i led the complaint or 
the date the t r i a l was held. 
In 5 2 C . J . S . Landlord & Tenant Section 52 (b) at page 
742, the following i s found: 
" I t has been held that rents accruing after 
t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of an action for rent may not be 
r e c o v e r e d , even where the l and lo rd amends his 
compla in t so as to seek rents accruing during the 
course of the ac t ion ." 
In t he s e n t e n c e f o l l o w i n g the above-quoted sect ion, 
r e f e r e n c e is made to cases which have permitted the awarding 
of r e n t s to accrue in the future. A review of the Oklahoma 
case c i t e d as a u t h o r i t y for t h a t p r o p o s i t i o n , however, 
d i s c l o s e s t h a t the award, for future rents contemplated that 
t h e t e n a n t would remain in possession of the property and 
t h e award for f u t u r e r e n t s was contingent upon the tenant 
remaining in possession of the premises. 
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The f o r e g o i n g p ropos i t ion that only that ren ta l which 
has accrued prior to the date of the f i l i ng of the complaint 
o r the d a t e of t h e t r i a l , in p a r t , i s based upon the 
d o c t r i n e of e q u i t y which requires a mitigation of damages 
and losses• 
In 52 C . J . S . Landlord & Tenant Section 559 at pages 
694-695, the following is found: 
"An a c t i o n for rent will not l i e un t i l such 
rent i s due and payable. . . . 
• . . Even where the tenant repudiates the 
l e a s e , or where the tenant abandons the premises 
b e f o r e t he e x p i r a t i o n of his term and not i f ies 
t h e l a n d l o r d t h a t he wil l not abide by the rent 
c o n t r a c t , the landlord has no r ight of action for 
t he r en t un t i l i t f a l l s due under the contract . . 
. . [See Louisiana case to the contrary] 
. . . Where a l e a s e requires the lessee to 
pay r e n t in monthly i n s t a l l m e n t s and provides 
t h a t t he r i g h t to r e c o v e r each monthly payment 
would c o n s t i t u t e a separate cause of act ion, the 
l e s s o r i s a t l i b e r t y t o a l low t h e causes of 
a c t i o n for monthly d e f i c i e n c i e s to accumulate, 
and to r e c o v e r on several at the same time, but 
he may not r e c o v e r any d e f i c i e n c y u n t i l i t 
a c t u a l l y accrues and is ascertained in the manner 
p rov ided in the lease . Generally there may be no 
recovery for installments not yet due. 
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I n 5 2 C . J . S . L a n d l o r d & T e n a n t S e c t i o n 568 ( a ) , a t 
p a g e 7 4 0 - 7 4 1 , t h e f o l l o w i n g i s f o u n d : 
" I n a n a c t i o n f o r r e n t , i n t h e a b s e n c e of 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s w h i c h r e n d e r i t i n e q u i t a b l e t o 
a w a r d t h e f u l l s t i p u l a t e d r e n t a l , t h e l a n d l o r d 
may r e c o v e r t h e e n t i r e amoun t d u e and u n p a i d , . 
. I f t h e l a n d l o r d r e l e t s t h e p r e m i s e s a f t e r t h e 
t e n a n t ' s a b a n d o n m e n t t h e r e o f , h i s m e a s u r e of 
d a m a g e s h a s b e e n h e l d t o b e t h e a g r e e d r e n t a l 
l e s s t h e a m o u n t r e a l i z e d f r o m r e l e t t i n g . . . 
[ E m p h a s i s a d d e d , ] 
A p p e l l a n t r e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t f s 
J u d g m e n t i s t h e r e f o r e w i t h o u t any s u p p o r t i n g e v i d e n c e o r 
F i n d i n g s , i s c o n t r a r y t o t h e common l aw r u l e , and t h e r emedy 
c l a u s e o f t h e L e a s e a g r e e m e n t , and a s s u c h i s r e v e r s i b l e 
e r r o r . 
2 . A C L A I M FOR DAMAGES FOR FUTURE 
RENTAL LOSSES CONSTITUTES A CLAIM, NOT 
FOR RENTAL, BUT INSTEAD FOR DAMAGES FOR 
FUTURE L O S S E S , WHICH DAMAGES MUST BE 
ESTABLISHED BY COMPETANT EVIDENCE. 
I n 5 1 C C . J . S . L a n d l o r d & T e n a n t S e c . 250 ( 2 ) a t 
p a g e s 6 6 1 - 6 6 2 , t h i s comment i s f o u n d : 
It 
s u r r e n d e r s 
t h e 
a l t h 
t h e 
damages 
ough th 
amount 
measure of 
t o b 
t h e 
>e the d 
b a l a n c e 
I f 
t h e 
a c 
e 1 
of 
the lessee wrongfully abandons or 
leased premises, he is l i ab le for 
t u a l l 
ease 
dama 
damages 
i fference 
of t he 
y s u s t a i n e d by the lessor , 
c o n t a i n s 
,ges for 
in such a 
: between i 
term and 
no provision as to 
the b r e a c h . 
case had been 
The 
held 
the agreed rent for 
the actual or fa i r 
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r e n t a l v a l u e of t h e p r e m i s e s , a t t h e t ime of t h e 
b r e a c h . . . " 
I n t h e c a s e a t hand , t h e on ly damage fo r f u t u r e r e n t a l 
l o s s e s w h i c h c o u l d h a v e b e e n a w a r d e d a t t h e t i m e of 
a b a n d o n m e n t w o u l d have t o have been t h e d i f f e r e n c e between 
t h e l e a s e a g r e e m e n t r a t e of D e f e n d a n t s 1 l e a s e and t h e l e a s e 
agreement r a t e of t h e I n t e r m o u n t a i n Marke t ing l e a s e . 
I n t h e c a s e a t hand , P l a i n t i f f s were not e n t i t l e d t o an 
a w a r d of t h e b a l a n c e of t h e r e n t a l payments which had no t 
y e t a c c r u e d bu t which were due under t h e t e rms of t h e l e a s e 
a g r e e m e n t f o r f u t u r e m o n t h s , a n d t h e a w a r d of s u c h 
c o n s t i t u t e d r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . 
3 . PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO 
ACCELERATE THE RENTAL DUE UNDER THE 
TERMS OF THE LEASE AGREEMENT. 
The L e a s e a g r e e m e n t does no t p r o v i d e fo r or a l l o w t h e 
P l a i n t i f f s t o a c c e l e r a t e t h e b a l a n c e due under t h e t e rms of 
t h e L e a s e a g r e e m e n t . Even i f i t h a d , such a c c e l e r a t i o n 
c l a u s e s a r e n o t e n f o r c e a b l e u n l e s s t h e t e n a n t r e t a i n s 
p o s s e s s i o n of t h e p r e m i s e s d u r i n g t h e r e m a i n d e r of t h e 
p e r i o d fo r which t h e r e n t i s a c c e l e r a t e d . 
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Numerous courts have held that accelerat ion clauses may 
not be en fo rced u n l e s s the landlord allows the tenant to 
remain in possession of the premises during the duration of 
the lease agreement. 
In 5 2 C . J . S . Landlord & Tenant Section 512 at pages 
484-485, the following is found: 
" . . A l s o t he l e a s e may p r o v i d e for 
a c c e l e r a t i n g t he time of the payment of rent on 
c e r t a i n c o n t i n g e n c i e s , as where t h e r e i s a 
d e f a u l t in t h e payment of rent which is due, on 
t h e removal, or attempt at removal, by the tenant 
of goods from the premises in the case of a levy 
of e x e c u t i o n , or on t h e t e n a n t ' s becoming 
i n s o l v e n t , bankrupt, or making an assignment for 
t h e b e n e f i t of c r e d i t o r s . Such provisions are 
n o t v o i d a s a g a i n s t p u b l i c p o l i c y , but a 
p r o v i s i o n t h a t the rent for the whole term shal l 
become due on f a i l u r e of the lessee to perform 
"any" covenant or condition has been held i l l e g a l 
as imposing a p e n a l t y . . . . I t has been held 
t h a t the landlord may not co l lec t the en t i re rent 
under an a c c e l e r a t i o n clause and dispossess the 
l e s s e e b e f o r e t h e e x p i r a t i o n of the lease , nor 
may he t e r m i n a t e the l e a s e and c o l l e c t r e n t 
beyond the time the lessee was allowed to remain 
in possesion." 
In the case a t hand, t he P l a i n t i f f s remodelled and 
r e l e t t h e p remises to I n t e r m o u n t a i n Marke t ing a f t e r 
Defendants v a c a t e d . When Defendants vacated the premises, 
t hey had paid a l l renta l due to the date of abandonment. On 
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t h e d a t e P l a i n t i f f s commenced l e g a l a c t i o n , a p p r o x i m a t e l y 
o n e - h a l f t o one and o n e - h a l f m o n t h ' s r e n t had acc rued ( l e s s 
t h e p r e p a y m e n t made by D e f e n d a n t s ) a n d I n t e r m o u n t a i n 
M a r k e t i n g had t a k e n p o s s e s s i o n of t h e p r e m i s e s . Under t h e 
common l a w , P l a i n t i f f s were no t e n t i t l e d t o damages f o r any 
more t h a n o n e - h a l f t o one and o n e - h a l f m o n t h ' s r e n t . 
The r e l i e f g r a n t e d P l a i n t i f f s by t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s no t 
p r o v i d e d f o r , a l l o w e d o r p e r m i t t e d unde r any common law 
p r e c e d e n t known t o D e f e n d a n t s ' c o u n s e l , o r u n d e r a n y 
p r o v i s i o n c o n t a i n e d in t h e Lease a g r e e m e n t . 
The j u d g m e n t a w a r d e d P l a i n t i f f s by t h e t r i a l c o u r t 
c o n s t i t u t e s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r in and of i t s e l f . 
4 . P L A I N T I F F S ' JUDGMENT APPEARS TO BE 
ONE OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 
The J u d g m e n t r e n d e r e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t p r o v i d e s as 
f o l l o w s : 
" 1 0 . P l a i n t i f f s s h o u l d be awarded judgment 
a g a i n s t D e f e n d a n t s i n t h e amount of $ 1 , 1 0 0 . 0 0 f o r 
e a c h m o n t h , d u e on t h e f i r s t of e a c h m o n t h , 
b e g i n n i n g N o v e m b e r 1 , 1983 , and c o n t i n u i n g u n t i l 
t h e e x p i r a t i o n of t h e L e a s e t e rm on October 3 1 , 
1 9 8 5 m i n u s a n y a m o u n t s , a f t e r s u b t r a c t i n g t h e 
c o s t s and expenses of r e l e t t i n g , P l a i n t i f f s o b t a i n 
t h r o u g h r e l e t t i n g t h e p r e m i s e s . " (R. 353 , a t 
3 6 1 . ) 
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In t h e case a t hand, t he Judgment awarded P la in t i f f s 
a p p e a r s to be one of specific performance in equity, since 
i t r e q u i r e s the Defendants to pay the rental due each and 
e v e r y month as r e q u i r e d under the te rms of the l e a s e 
a g r e e m e n t . Defendants know of no common law precedent or 
any provision in the lease agreement which permits the t r i a l 
c o u r t t o make such an award, and t h e judgment therefore 
cons t i tu tes revers ible error in and of i t s e l f . 
If t h i s i s a judgment for s p e c i f i c performance, the 
t r i a l court committed error by also awarding damages for the 
c o s t of r e m o d e l l i n g t he p remises for the benefit another 
tenant . 
If t h e judgment i s one of specif ic performance of the 
l e a s e ag reemen t , then and in that event, P l a in t i f f s should 
a l s o have been required to spec i f ica l ly perform and tender 
possession of the leasehold premises to Defendants. 
If t h i s judgment is not one of specific performance, i t 
does not r e q u i r e the P l a i n t i f f s to mitigate the l o s s , i t 
only p r o v i d e s t h a t if they do m i t i g a t e t he l o s s , "any 
amounts" r e c e i v e d s h a l l be s u b t r a c t e d from the accruing 
amount. 
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I f t h e j u d g m e n t i s n o t one of s p e c i f i c p e r f o r m a n c e i t 
c o n s t i t u t e s a p e n a l t y a n d a f o r f e i t u r e and i s c o n t r a r y t o 
p u b l i c p o l i c y a n d i s v o i d . The p e n a l t y and f o r f e i t u r e i s 
t h e f o r f e i t u r e o f t h e l e a s e h o l d p r e m i s e s a n d t h e t o t a l 
a m o u n t d u e f o r t h e r e m a i n i n g t e r m o f t h e l e a s e , w i t h no 
r e q u i r e m e n t of m i t i g a t i o n of l o s s , 
POINT NO. V I I 
THE CASE AT HAND INVOLVES A QUESTION OF 
E Q U I T Y . THE STANDARDS FOR APPELLATE 
REVIEW OF QUESTIONS OF EQUITY NOT ONLY 
P E R M I T , BUT ALSO COMPEL THE APPELLATE 
C O U R T TO R E V I E W THE FACTS AND THE 
EVIDENCE TO DETERMINE IF THE TRIAL COURT 
P R O P E R L Y D E T E R M I N E D THE FACTS AND 
APPLIED THEM TO THE CASE AT HAND. 
S e c t i o n 7 8 - 2 - 2 o f t h e U t a h Code A n n o t a t e d and R u l e 72 
o f t h e U t a h R u l e s o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e c o n t e m p l a t e t h a t on 
q u e s t i o n s of e q u i t y , t h e a p p e a l may be t a k e n on t h e f a c t s a s 
w e l l a s t h e l aw a p p l i c a b l e . 
T h e d o c t r i n e o f C o n s t r u c t i v e E v i c t i o n i s an e q u i t a b l e 
d e f e n s e . The word i t s e l f c o n v e y s i t s o r i g i n . 
"CONSTRUCTIVE. T h a t w h i c h i s e s t a b l i s h e d by 
t h e m i n d o f t h e l a w i n i t s a c t o f c o n s t r u i n g 
f a c t s , c o n d u c t , c i r c u m s t a n c e s o r i n s t r u m e n t s ; t h a t 
w h i c h h a s n o t t h e c h a r a c t e r a s s i g n e d t o i t i n i t s 
own e s s e n t i a l n a t u r e , b u t a c q u i r e s s u c h c h a r a c t e r 
i n c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e way i n w h i c h i t i s r e g a r d e d 
b y a r u l e o r p o l i c y o f l a w ; h e n c e , i n f e r r e d , 
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i m p l i e d , made out by l e g a l in te rpre ta t ion ;—the 
word " l e g a l " be ing sometimes used in l i e u of 
" c o n s t r u c t i v e . " " (Black fs Law Dictionary, Revised 
Fourth Edition, page 386.) 
In the same l i gh t , the phrase "constructive t r u s t " also 
came into being through equity. 
"A c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t i s a c r e a t u r e of 
e q u i t y . . . So, the doctrine of constructive t r u s t 
i s an ins t rument of equity for the maintenance of j u s t i c e , good f a i t h , and good conscience rest ing 
on a sound p u b l i c p o l i c y . . . In t h i s respect 
c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t s have been s a i d t o a r i s e 
t h r o u g h t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t he d o c t r i n e of 
e q u i t a b l e e s t o p p e l , or under the broad doctrine 
t h a t e q u i t y r e g a r d s and t r e a t s as done what in 
good c o n s c i e n c e ought t o be done." (89 C.J.S. 
Trusts Sect. 139 at page 1015.) 
As has been p r e v i o u s l y mentioned in th i s Memorandum, 
t h e overwhelming weight of the evidence demonstrates that 
t h e t r i a l court was in error in not finding that P l a in t i f f s 1 
conduct c o n s t i t u t e d a breach of the lease agreement and a 
c o n s t r u c t i v e e v i c t i o n . Since the appeal i s based upon the 
e q u i t a b l e d o c t r i n e of " c o n s t r u c t i v e e v i c t i o n , " t he 
A p p e l l a n t s r e s p e c t f u l l y submit that the Court may properly 
look a t t h e u n r e b u t t e d and overwhelming weight of the 
e v i d e n c e and reverse the decision of the t r i a l court on the 
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grounds t h a t t he unrebutted and overwhelming weight of the 
evidence was contrary to the t r i a l cou r t ' s decision. 
In a d d i t i o n , t h e j u d g m e n t i s one of s p e c i f i c 
p e r f o r m a n c e , r e q u i r i n g t he Defendants to s p e c i f i c a l l y 
perform by pay ing r e n t a l to the P l a i n t i f f s on a monthly 
basis under the terms of the lease agreement. 
Because t he remedy granted is an equitable remedy, the 
Utah Supreme Court i s en t i t l ed to review the facts and make 
a determinat ion of the propriety of the decision rendered by 
the t r i a l court . 
The argument t h a t the t r i e r of fact was in a be t te r 
p o s i t i o n to obse rve the witnesses and render a decision on 
t h e f a c t s does not have as much merit in the case at hand 
fo r t he reason that the case was t r i ed by the Court on July 
1 8 , 1983. The t r i a l court issued i t s Memorandum Decision on 
September 29 , 1983 , more than two months after the date of 
the t r i a l . 
SUMMARY 
The t r i a l c o u r t f a i l e d to make findings of material 
facts which are per t inent tc the issues of the case. 
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Had t h e t r i a l c o u r t made f i n d i n g s r e g a r d i n g those 
p e r t i n e n t f a c t s , i t would have been compelled to make those 
f i n d i n g s c o n s i s t e n t wi th the overwhelming , unrebu t ted 
evidence. 
Had the t r i a l c o u r t made the findings consistent with 
t h e overwhelming, unrebutted evidence, those findings would 
have supported the claims of Defendants, not the P l a i n t i f f s . 
The Conclusions of Law are not supported by Findings as 
required. 
The t r i a l c o u r t f a i l e d to p r o p e r l y apply the law 
c o n c e r n i n g "constructive evict ion" to the facts in the case 
a t hand. The law and the applicable facts demonstrate that 
D e f e n d a n t s s u b s t a n t i a t e d by overwhelming , u n r e b u t t e d 
e v i d e n c e t h a t they had been construct ively evicted from the 
premises. 
The t r i a l c o u r t f a i l e d to r e q u i r e the P la in t i f f s to 
make an e l e c t i o n of remedy and then further compounded the 
e r r o r by c o n c l u d i n g the P la in t i f f s had elected to proceed 
under t h e defaul t clause of the lease agreement but awarded 
a judgment for a remedy neither specified nor provided for 
under the terms of the lease agreement. 
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The judgment rendered by the trial court is contrary to 
the terms of the lease agreement and the common law and such 
an award constitutes reversible error in and of itself. 
The conduct of the Plaintiffs, constituted an election 
to terminate the lease agreement and it was reversible error 
for the trial court to fail to so hold. 
The judgment awarded by the trial court constitutes an 
award of either specific performance, or an award of future 
damages which are not supported by any evidence as to actual 
damage or market value. 
The case involves questions of equity and the Appellate 
Court is entitled to review the facts as well as the law and 
issue an approriate decision thereon. 
The decision of the trial court should be reversed and 
either: 
1. Defendants should be awarded judgment on their 
counterclaim; or, 
2. The case should be remanded with instructions; or, 
3. The judgment awarded Plaintiffs should be reduced 
to the amount of rental accrued and unpaid from the date of 
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vacation of the premises, to wit: February 15, 1981 to April 
1, 1981, together with reasonable attorney's fees. 
Respectfully submitted this \L day of April, 1984. 
Jacpk L. Schoenhals 
Attorney for Appellants. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing brief 
to Re id Tateoka, McKay, Burton, Thurman & Condie, Attorneys 
for Respondents, 500 Kennecott Building, Salt Lake City, 
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